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APPELLANT'S JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction of this Court is conferred pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2)(i) (Supp. 1993) This action involves the appeal of certain provisions of Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Defendant's Petition for Modification on Remand
signed and entered in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah on January 20, 1994. A timely Notice of Appeal was filed on February 8, 1994.

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Copies of the following are found in Addendum A to this brief:
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1993 Supp.)
Carlton v. Carlton, 756 P.2d 86 (Utah App. 1988)
Muir v. Muir. 841 P.2d 736 (Utah App. 1992)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final Order on Defendant's Petition for Modification
on Remand entered by the lower court pursuant to this Court's remand of the case in Muir
v. Muir, Case No. 900603-CA, 841 P.2d 736 (Utah App. 1992). The Defendant/Appellant
Michael D. Muir filed a Petition for Modification seeking to modify the parties' Decree of
Divorce entered in September 1985. Mr. Muir sought to reduce or terminate his alimony
obligation on the grounds that his income had decreased since entry of the decree; that Mrs.
Muir had become employed since the time of the divorce; that he had remarried and had new
expenses; and that he was contributing to the support of the parties' adult children. The trial
on Mr. Muir's petition was held October 11, 1990, and the lower court found that Mr.
Muir's income had in fact been reduced and Mrs. Muir's income had increased, thereby
establishing a significant change in circumstances to modify alimony. The trial court entered
its order reducing alimony from $1,500 per month to the amount of $900 per month, and
awarding Mrs. Muir $3,000 towards her attorney's fees. Mrs. Muir appealed, and this
Court remanded the case back to the trial court for adequate findings supported by the
evidence on the issues of substantial change of circumstances, alimony and attorneys fees.
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On remand, the lower court entered its Order denying Mr. Muir's Petition to Modify,
thereby maintaining the original alimony award of $1,500 per month, and ordered Mr. Muir
to pay all of Mrs. Muir's attorney's fees and costs. Mr. Muir filed his Notice of Appeal
dated February 8, 1994, and a Docketing Statement dated March 2, 1994.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A. Background.
Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered on September
16, 1985. (R. 87-93) In August of 1989, Defendant filed a Verified Petition to Reduce and
Eliminate Alimony. (R. 98-102) The petition came on for trial on October 11, 1990 in the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Homer S. Wilkinson, presiding. The trial court found that there had been a substantial
change of circumstances since entry of the Decree of Divorce to justify a reduction in
Defendant's alimony obligation. The trial court reduced Plaintiff's award from $1,500 to
$900 per month and ordered Defendant to pay $3,000 of Plaintiffs attorney's fees. (R. 178180)
At the time of trial on Defendant's Petition, these facts were presented to the Court:
The parties and their respective counsel entered into a settlement stipulation on August 23,
1985, which formed the basis for their divorce. Pursuant to the stipulation incorporated into
the Decree of Divorce, the "property as . . . divided adjusted for payment of the debts of the
parties ... [was] an equal division of the property with each of them being awarded
approximately one-half of the value of the marital estate". (R. 91) Mrs. Muir received

3

property valued at approximately $416,000, including the marital residence valued at
$370,000, the Mercedes Benz valued at $10,500, shares of water stock valued at $10,000, a
Cottonwood Country Club membership valued at $1,000 and cash in the amount of $25,000.
Mr. Muir was awarded all of the common stock in Fairmont Bowl owned by himself and
Mrs. Muir, together with other assets valued at approximately $77,500. The parties agreed
that Mrs. Muir should receive alimony in the amount of $1,500 per month, and it was so
ordered by the court.
B.

Financial Circumstances of Mr, Muir and Fairmont Bowl.

Throughout the Muir marriage, Mr. Muir supported his family with income from
Fairmont Bowl, Inc., a Utah Subchapter S corporation which, until recently, he had owned
and managed jointly with his father, Douglas Muir. (Tr. 16, 20-21) At the time of trial,
Douglas Muir no longer owned stock in Fairmont Bowl. (Tr. 59, 61) During each year of
the marriage and subsequent to the divorce, Mr. Muir received compensation from Fairmont
Bowl, plus a profit allocation based on his percentage ownership of the business. (Ex. 3; Tr.
20-21) By 1990, Mr. Muir was a 96.61% shareholder. (Ex. 3; Tr. 113-114) This increase
in stock ownership resulted from post-divorce gifts of stock from Mr. Muir's father. (Tr.
24, 31, 59)
Fairmont Bowl operated on a fiscal year ending June 30. For tax purposes, the
income of Fairmont Bowl as an S Corporation was reflected on the personal income tax
returns of Mr. Muir, who was then assessed both personal and corporate taxes. Each tax
return declared Mr. Muir's previous calendar year income and Fairmont Bowl's previous
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fiscal year income (Tr. 8), but did not show the actual day-to-day, month-to-month matching
of individual and corporate income and expenses. For example, Mr. Muir's 1989 income tax
return included his January 1, 1989 to December 31, 1989 income, but Fairmont Bowl's July
I
1, 1988 to June 30, 1989 income.
Since Mr. Muir was the majority shareholder of Fairmont Bowl at time of trial, for
purposes of accurately determining the amount of income available for payment of his
alimony obligation, it was necessary to look at the combined financial positions of Fairmont
Bowl and Mr. Muir. (Tr. 147) Though the corporation used fiscal accounting and Mr. Muir
used calendar year accounting, for trial Mr. Muir's income was adjusted by the accountant
for Fairmont Bowl, Ed Bates, to match the corporation's fiscal year finances as follows: to
each relevant fiscal year of the corporation, Ed Bates added back Mr. Muir's compensation
for the same twelve month time period. (Tr. 8, 19)
The financial statements of Fairmont Bowl and Mr. Muir's finances were, after
calendar to fiscal year adjustment, combined and summarized by Ed Bates, a CPA and
partner of the accounting firm of Coopers & Lybrand, which had been preparing federal
income tax returns on behalf of Fairmont Bowl, Mr. Muir and Douglas Muir for the past 19
years prior to trial. (Exs. 1 and 3; Tr. 16) All combined income of Fairmont Bowl and Mr.
Muir for the fiscal years 1983 through 1990 was reflected in Exhibits 1 and 3 submitted at
trial. (Tr. 67)
In 1985, the year of the divorce, Mr. Muir's compensation was $52,800 and his
profit allocation was $65,777, for total earnings before tax of $118,577. (Exs. 1 and 3; Tr.
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22, 214) By 1990, there had been a significant drop in Mr. Muir's total earnings, with
compensation decreasing to $48,400 and profit allocation decreasing to $33,235, for a total
earnings before tax of $81,635. (Exs. 1 and 3; Tr. 214) During the years 1986 through
1989, Mr. Muir's total earnings before tax ranged from $61,228 to $70,938. (Exs. 1 and 3)
The reasons for the significant drop in Mr. Muir's earnings since 1985 were related
directly to the bowling industry and climate and the age of Fairmont Bowl's facility. Since
1985, the bowling industry had declined, and there were many fewer bowlers in 1990 than
there were in 1985. (Tr. 62-63) Mr. Muir and his father had forestalled a significant
decrease in the gross receipts of Fairmont Bowl, despite annual inflation of 4 to 6 percent,
by increasing prices to fewer bowlers. (Tr. 27, 28 and 62) To justify increasing prices. Mr.
Muir had to increase services and had, by doing so, also incurred additional business
expenses. (Tr. 64) In essence, the income of Fairmont Bowl, from 1986 to 1989, remained
steady while its expenses increased. (Tr. 37-38)
At the time of the trial on Defendant's Petition, the Fairmont Bowl facility was old,
and no major equipment had been replaced since 1958. (Tr. 65) Although Mr. Muir
remained competitive by computerizing his scoring devices and making physical
improvements to the center, including painting, wall coverings, new carpet, new ball racks
and new bowler seating, the bowling lanes themselves were then thirty years old and worn
out. The replacement cost was estimated at $35,000 apiece. (Tr. 75-76, 65, 157) The
replacement costs were to be met from gross revenues or from loans obtained by Fairmont
Bowl. (Tr. 66)
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As the majority shareholder of Fairmont Bowl, Mr. Muir managed the business and
exercised discretion over how business funds were to be spent. The business must remain
competitive to survive, however, and between 76 to 82% of the gross receipts of Fairmont
Bowl between 1986 and the time of trial were used by the business to pay normal operating
expenses. (Ex. 3; Tr. 215) The income remaining after payment of operating expenses was
subject to the discretion of Mr. Muir. In years when Mr. Muir elected to take higher than
normal compensation, the corporation suffered a loss; and Mr. Muir received a loss rather
than profit allocation. (Tr. 11-12, 40, 67, 152) If Mr. Muir borrowed money from
Fairmont Bowl, he was required to pay that money back.
Despite Mr. Muir's increase in percentage ownership of Fairmont Bowl, his overall
earnings had gone down significantly since 1985 and the time of trial. (Tr. 23) The gross
profits of Fairmont Bowl had decreased, and the net income of Fairmont Bowl before paying
Mr. Muir's compensation and before deducting depreciation decreased in all but one year
since 1985. (Ex. 3; Tr. 28-29)
Mr. Muir incurred attorney's fees in the amount of $6,000 related to his Petition for
Modification. (Tr. 196)
C. Mrs. Muir's Financial Circumstances.
Mrs. Muir had a college degree in commercial art. (Tr. 28) Prior to the divorce, she
was employed by Fairmont Bowl. (Tr. 155) When the parties separated, her employment
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with Fairmont Bowl terminated, and by the time of the divorce in 1985, Mrs. Muir was
operating a business, Rocky Mountain Vacation Homes, from which she did not receive
income. (Tr. 43-44, 161) At the time of trial, Mrs. Muir had been employed by American
Airlines since May of 1987. (Tr. 42, 167)
At the time of the divorce, Mrs. Muir was awarded the marital residence valued at
$370,000. (R. 71, 88) The total monthly obligation on the residence was $939, including a
$609 mortgage, $260 in property taxes, and a $70 insurance premium. (Ex. 26; Tr. 45)
Beginning in May, 1987 and throughout the remainder of that year, Mrs. Muir's
residence was vacant. (Tr. 46) Through 1988, she rented her residence to friends for $600
per month, but she continued to pay the utilities on the residence. (Tr. 46-47) Through
1989, Mrs. Muir rented her residence to friends for one month at $600 rent, and the
remaining 11 months at $700 per month, and continued to pay the utilities. (Tr. 47-48) In
June, 1990, the marital residence was rented pursuant to a one-year lease which ran from
June 1990 through June 1991 for $1,200 per month, and the tenants were required to pay
their own utilities. (Tr. 45)
Mrs. Muir also owned a barn on which she was receiving rental income in the amount
of $220 per month at the time of trial. (Tr. 168)
Since 1986 up until trial, Mrs. Muir had received annual income from the Wetherill
Trust, a trust established by her grandfather. The disbursements increased from $1,200 per
year in 1986 to $1,961 per year in 1989. (Ex. 25; Tr. 163)
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Mrs. Muir's income from employment, disbursements from Wetherill Trust and rental
income on her residence, but excluding alimony, in the years 1985 through September 15,
1990 was as follows:
Year

Gross Income without Alimony

1985

0.00

1986

$4,549.00

1987

$12,959.00

1988

$22,281.00

1989

$30,870.00

1990 (thru 9/30)

16,924.00

(Ex. 25; Tr. 44, 163)
The 1990 income figure was derived by dividing Mrs. Muir's year-to-date gross
income from American Airlines as of September 1990, in the amount of $12,724.39 by 9
months for average monthly earnings of $1,400. Her average monthly earnings were then
multiplied by 12 months for 1990 annual income of approximately $16,924.00. (Tr. 167)
This figure did not include Mrs. Muir's supplemental residential income of $1,200 per
month, barn rental income of $220.00 per month, Wetherill trust income, interest or
dividend income.
Mrs. Muir's 1989 gross income as declared on her 1989 federal income tax return
was $20,600 of wages, $1,900 of dividend income, $262 of interest income and $8,300 of
rental income from the marital residence. (Ex. 2; Tr. 33-34)
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Mrs. Muir incurred attorney's fees defending against the Petition to Modify in the
approximate amount of $16,000. (Tr. 194-195)
Mrs. Muir appealed the lower court's reduction of Mr. Muir's alimony obligation and
the award of her attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to
the lower court to enter adequate findings, supported by sufficient evidence, regarding
whether the material circumstances of the parties had or had not substantially changed in
ways not contemplated by the original decree. (See Muir v. Muir. 841 P.2d 736 (Utah App.
1992)). The Court of Appeals also remanded for entry f adequate findings relating to Mrs.
Muir's financial need and Mr. Muir's ability to pay attorney's fees together with the
reasonableness of the fees. (Id at 741.)
D. Proceedings Subsequent to Remand.
After the case was remanded to the lower court, both parties filed motions for entry
of supplemental findings with the court. (R. 211-217 and R. 223-224) Defendant requested
a hearing before the court on three occasions and filed an objection to Mrs. Muir's proposed
findings. (R.239-243) No hearing was granted by the court to hear the parties' respective
arguments in support of their motions for entry of supplemental findings on remand. The
only hearing held by the court before it issued its minute entry on December 22, 1993, in
which it essentially adopted the supplemental findings prepared by Plaintiff, was held in
chambers, off the record, and with only counsel present. In the December minute entry, the
court adopted the Findings of Fact as submitted by the Plaintiff, with a few interlineations
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made by the court, and instructed Plaintiff's counsel to prepare the final Findings and Order.
(R. 281) The court concluded that it had been reversed by this Court and had erred by
finding a substantial changes of circumstances and reducing Defendant's alimony obligation.
The court reinstated the full amount, ordered Defendant to pay the unpaid amounts that
accrued during the pendency of the appeal in the total sum of $23,400, and ordered
Defendant to pay all of Plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs, including costs incurred on
appeal, in the total unpaid amount of $21,192.50, for a total of $44,592.50. (R. 293-295)
Mr. Muir appeals the court's order denying his Petition to Reduce and Eliminate
Alimony and ordering him to pay all of Mrs. Muir's attorney's fees and costs.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The lower court failed to comply with this Court's mandate on remand. It

failed to make findings on all material issues, and its failure to do so constituted reversible
error.
2.

The findings made by the court on remand are inadequate and against the clear

weight of evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous.
3.

As a result of the lower court's failure to comply with this Court's mandate on

remand and its complete reversal of its prior decision based upon the same evidence, this
Court should enter its own order on the motions and documents submitted by the parties on
remand and adopting Mr. Muir's supplemental findings.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATE OF
THIS COURT ON REMAND TO ENTER ADEQUATE FINDINGS TO
SUPPORT ITS ORDER. AS A RESULT, THE ORDER ENTERED SHOULD
BE REVERSED AND ONCE AGAIN REMANDED.
When a case is remanded, a lower court has the duty to comply with the mandate of
this Court, or its order should be reversed. In its previous decision in this case, this Court
concluded that the lower court had failed to make adequate findings to support its decision
that there had been a substantial change in circumstances sufficient to warrant a reduction in
Mr. Muir's alimony obligation. In remanding the case for entry of adequate findings, this
Court did so with very detailed instructions as to what findings were necessary. Specifically,
the lower court was to make the findings which addressed the following evidence:
(a)

The decrease in Mr. Muir's income when his ownership in the business

increased by eighteen percent;
(b)

The evidence that the company substantially reduced its liabilities in 1988;

(c)

The evidence relating to statements made by Mr. Muir as to his net worth in

credit applications made since the decree; and
(d)

The testimony regarding "loans to shareholders" on the books of the business

amounting to cash not included in Mr. Muir's compensation.
In addition, this Court determined that the lower court failed to make adequate
findings on the issue of whether Mr. Muir benefitted beyond the salary that he earned and
whether or not the need to invest significant amounts of capital into his business in the
12

immediate future was discretionary or whether it was necessary to maintain the business in
its present condition. On these issues, the lower court was instructed to "enter adequate
findings, supported by sufficient evidence, regarding whether the material circumstances of
these parties have or have not substantially changed in ways not contemplated by the original
decree such that modification of the decree may be warranted." (Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d
736,741 (UtahApp. 1992).
Finally, this Court concluded that the lower court also failed to make adequate
findings regarding Mrs. Muir's need for attorney's fees, Mr. Muir's ability to pay her
attorney's fees, and the reasonableness of the fees incurred. (Id. at 742.)
On remand to the lower court, Mr. Muir submitted Defendant's Motion for Order in
Re: Entry of Supplemental Findings of Fact, dated April 14, 1993, (R. 211-217) and after
Mrs. Muir failed to respond within the time provided by Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial
Administration, Mr. Muir subsequently filed his Notice to Submit and Request for Ruling
dated April 26, 1993. (R. 218-19) Mrs. Muir's counsel filed an Objection to the Notice to
Submit on April 26, 1993. (R. 222) More than three weeks later, on May 17, 1993, she
filed own her Motion, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of Modification on
Remand. (R. 223-238)
Without allowing Mr. Muir the requisite time to respond to Mrs. Muir's Motion, the
lower court signed and entered Mrs. Muir's Order on May 26, 1993, only nine days after it
was submitted. (R. 236-238) Mr. Muir objected to entry of the Order, (R.239-243) and the
trial court recognized its premature decision and allowed the parties to schedule a hearing.
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At the same time, Mr. Muir filed his Objections to Mrs. Muir's proposed findings of fact,
setting forth specific evidentiary bases that her proposed findings were not supported by the
evidence. (R. 244-254) He also filed a Request for Hearing on June 15, 1993 (R 262-263),
a second request on July 13, 1993 (R-266-267), and a third request on September 30, 1993.
(R. 272-273) At no time did Mrs. Muir file an objection to the supplemental Findings of
Fact submitted by Mr. Muir.
Although purporting to grant a hearing on the respective motions, the lower court
simply met with counsel in chambers, without a court reporter, to make its determinations
regarding the issues to be addressed. In its Minute Entry dated August 19, 1993, the court
simply stated with regard to that hearing that Mr. Muir's objections were "discussed but not
resolved." (R. 268) At no time thereafter did the court grant Mr. Muir's requests for a
hearing wherein counsel could argue the evidence in the record in support of their respective
findings. Thereafter, by Minute Entry dated December 22, 1993, the lower court, without
ever holding a hearing as requested, entered Mrs. Muir's findings with a few handwritten
interlineations and modifications. (R. 281) Based on these findings and without taking any
additional evidence, the lower court did a one hundred and eighty degree turn, finding no
change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a reduction in Mr. Muir's alimony obligation.
The court entered judgment against him for all amounts due since entry of the first order
from which appeal was taken in the amount of $23,400. In addition, the court entered
judgment against Mr. Muir for all of Mrs. Muir's attorney's fees incurred in this case,
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including her fees on appeal in the amount of $21,192.50, for a total judgment of
$44,592.50. (R. 293-295)
The findings which the court made in support of its decision on remand are as
follows:
6. The Defendant alleged specific changes in circumstances in that
although his gross revenues from his business had remained consistent, that his
expenses had increased, depreciation had decreased and his business needed
capital investment.
7.
Plaintiffs accountant Mr. Randall Peterson, CPA, analyzed
seven years of tax returns from 1983 through 1989 filed by the Defendant. He
testified that the returns showed an average "pre-divorce" income to Defendant
of $104,678 and an average "post-divorce" income of $104,188. Accountant
Peterson analyzed the Defendant's "net spendable income" from 1983 to 1989
showing his post-divorce average (excluding alimony payments), to be $69,194
which was approximately $5,000 more than his before divorce average of
$68,819.
8.
The Defendant's accountant Mr. Ed Bates agreed with Plaintiffs
accountant that the gross revenues of the Fairmont Bowl Corporation have
been consistent and that it has been operated as a Subchapter S Corporation
since the parties' divorce. On this point, the accountants relief on the 1985
tax return for the fiscal year ending June 30,1985 showing gross receipts to be
$691,529 as compared with gross receipts at the end of fiscal year June 30,
1990 where gross receipts were $645,102.
9.
The Defendant has made improvements to the Fairmont Bowl
facility and had just finished computerizing the facility, added new carpeting,
new racks, new seating and other improvements since the divorce. Defendant
testified to the need for future improvements as well. Such capital
improvements are in the discretion of Defendant whose personal and business
finances are intertwined.
10.
Since the divorce, Defendant has prepared four separate
financial statements for First Interstate Bank which show that his total assets
and net worth since entry of the divorce as stated by him have increased from
at least $715,580 in assets on the statement dated January 3, 1986 to $989,000
in assets on a statement dated September 7, 1989.
15

11.
Both Plaintiffs and Defendant's accountants testified that due to
the corporations' Subchapter S status, the Defendant had total discretion over
the amount he took as compensation each year, in setting prices for his
product, and in making capital expenditures.
12.
The Defendant's business has paid for many personal expenses
for the Defendant and his family including payments for his family car, health
insurance, travel, auto and life insurance, tax deferred benefits including
pension contributions. Defendant benefits from his new wife drawing a salary
from the corporation.
13.
Based on the foregoing evidence and Findings, the Court finds
that there has not been a substantial change in the circumstances surrounding
Defendant's earnings since the parties' divorce. His income has been
consistent when all personal benefits are considered and given the Defendant's
discretion over allocating income between personal and business uses, it is
appropriate to include all such personal benefits.
14.
The Court finds that the Plaintiffs only work during the
marriage was at Fairmont Bowl where her wages were approximately $1,000
per month. At the time of the modification hearing Plaintiff was working as a
flight attendant for American Airlines earning $1,400 gross monthly income.
Plaintiff's employment required her to locate on the East Coast where she
resided in a basement apartment in her mother's home in Connecticut for
which she paid rent.
15.
Plaintiff has attempted to sell the marital asset she received in
the divorce consisting of the parties' marital residence in Salt Lake City valued
at $370,000 at the time of the divorce. The Plaintiff had lowered the sales
price to $280,000 and had received only one offer of $185,000 which she
rejected. She has continued to maintain the Salt Lake home as a rental
property and paying the mortgage thereon.
16.
At the time of Trial on October 1990, the Plaintiff's rental
income to date had been $4,200 and her mortgage costs had been $5,478 with
additional estimated taxes of $3,000 which would result in an income loss that
year.
17.
Plaintiffs monthly living expenses totalled $4,701 per month
which included keeping two homes and $907 per month on installment debt
relating to legal fees connected with the original divorce and to repay her
mother a $4,000 loan.
16

18.
Since the divorce Plaintiff has had significant periods of
unemployment, higher costs of living with the necessity of maintaining two
homes, and her tax returns show regular losses from business and real estate.
Plaintiff has been dependent on her alimony of $1,500 per month to meet her
basis living expenses which do not include any of the luxuries or amenities she
enjoyed during her marriage to Defendant such as vacations, country club
memberships, or new vehicles.
19.
A review of Plaintiffs tax return shows that in only one year,
1988, did her earned income exceeded her alimony income, when she earned
$20,609 in wages. However, for the year 1990 Plaintiff projected total
earnings of only $17,000 which is less than her alimony. Although Plaintiffs
income may have increased from $1,000 to $1,400 per month it is not
sufficiently large of a change to support a reduction of alimony in this case
considering Plaintiffs needs.
(R. 282-292)

These findings relating to the income and financial circumstances of the parties are
legally insufficient to support the court's decision on remand because they fail to address key
issues identified by this Court in its decision on the prior appeal. Contrary to the express
instructions by this Court, the lower court failed to make findings: a) as to why Mr. Muir's
income had significantly decreased when his ownership in the business increased by eighteen
percent; b) as to the reason for the reduction of the company's liabilities in 1988; c) as to the
"loans to shareholders" reflected on the books of the business; and d) whether Mr. Muir's
expenditures for capital improvements were discretionary or necessary to maintain the
business in its present condition.
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Turning next to the findings which the lower court made to support its award to Mrs.
Muir of all attorney's fees incurred by her in this action, there is only one:
22.
The Court finds Plaintiff has a need for attorney's fees based on
her financial circumstances including the fact that her present monthly
expenses exceed her monthly income. In addition Plaintiff is still paying on a
significant balance for legal fees remaining from her original divorce. The
Plaintiff also had a significantly more difficult task to defend against the
modification brought by Defendant to uncover necessary financial information
whereas Defendant had that information within his control. The Defendant has
also paid off significant debts since the time of the parties' divorce, has
invested in costly real estate and is building a home, and thus has the ability to
assist Plaintiff in the payment of fees. Defendant should pay the full amount
of Plaintiff's attorney's fees in the amount of $15,779, less credit for the
$3,000 he was ordered to pay at the initial trial in this matter for an attorney
fee award of $12,779.
(R. 289-290)
While this finding purports to address the financial needs of Mrs. Muir and Mr.
Muir's ability to pay her attorney fees, it is completely devoid of any discussion relating to
the reasonableness of the fees and costs incurred. This omission is contrary to this Court's
specific mandate to "make independent findings regarding the reasonableness of all fees and
costs of all the attorneys Wife has employed to defend the petition to reduce and eliminate
alimony, including fees incurred on appeal." (Muir, 841 P.2d. at 742.)
As outlined by this Court in Carlton v. Carlton, 756 P.2d 86 (Utah App. 1988), the
failure to make findings on material issues, especially in light of this Court's specific
instructions, constitutes reversible error:
The trial court must make findings on all material issues, and its
failure to do so constitutes reversible error "unless the facts in
the record are 'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting
only a finding in favor of the judgment.' " In addition, the
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findings must be sufficiently detailed and consist of enough
subsidiary facts to reveal the steps the court took to reach its
conclusion on each factual issue presented.
Id. at 87. (Citations omitted.)
Applying this principle to the facts of this case, the lower court failed to make
findings which it was specifically instructed to make by this Court on remand, both on the
issue of a substantial change of circumstances not contemplated at the time of the decree as
well as on the reasonableness of the attorney's fees. The findings mandated by this Court
are material to the issues upon which the lower court ruled, and as this Court pointed out in
the original appeal, the facts in the record are not so clear as to be capable of supporting
only one judgment. Therefore, at the very least, the decision must be reversed and
remanded once again for adequate findings amply supported by the record rather than a
simple and complete reversal in the decision reached. However, in light of the lower court's
complete disregard of this Court's mandate as established by the procedure which the lower
court employed to reach its decision, Mr. Muir asks this Court to rule on the parties'
motions on remand, together with Mr. Muir's objection to Mrs. Muir's proposed findings.
The appellant believes that the Court will conclude that Mr. Muir's findings are the only
findings amply supported by the evidence. Therefore, Mr. Muir requests this court remand
the case with specific instructions to enter the Supplemental Findings submitted by Mr. Muir
and an Order consistent therewith, in addition to an order requiring each party to pay their
own attorney's fees and costs incurred by them.
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POINT II
THE FINDINGS MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT ARE
INADEQUATE AND AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF
THE EVIDENCE, THUS MAKING THEM CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS
It is the appellant's duty to "marshall all of the evidence" in support of the lower
court's findings and then establish that it is insufficient to sustain the court's findings on
appeal. In such circumstances, the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence and
clearly erroneous, and therefore, they must be vacated. (See Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold
Storage and Warehouse, 336 U.A.R. 24, 872 P.2d 1051 (Utah App. 1994) and Ohline Corp.
v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602 (Utah App. 1993).)
In this case, the lower court's findings, even marshalling all of the evidence in the
record to support them, are inadequate and cannot stand. To begin first with Finding no. 19
that Mrs. Muir had earnings of $1,000 per month at the time of the parties' divorce, there is
simply no evidence to marshall in support of it. In fact, the evidence that she did not have
any income at the time of the divorce was uncontroverted at the trial on Mr. Muir's petition
to modify. Her own testimony was that she had "no real income" in 1985, the year that the
parties were divorced (Tr. 43), and that in 1986, she earned between "$3,000 and $4,000."
(Tr. 43) There was simply no evidence from which the court could find that Mrs. Muir's
income at the time of the divorce was $1,000 per month. Since the court relied on this
finding to conclude that there had been no material change of circumstances in Mrs. Muir's
financial condition since entry of the decree, the conclusion of law is likewise erroneous.
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Mr. Muir does not challenge the court's finding that, at the time of trial, Mrs. Muir
was earning $1,400 per month as a flight attendant for American Airlines. However, much
more evidence was received at trial relating to Mrs. Muir's financial condition upon which
the court failed to make any findings whatsoever. Specifically, Mrs. Muir testified that she
received at least $100 per month from a family trust (Tr. 43); $220 per month from the
rental of a barn (Tr. 164); and $1,200 per month from the rental of her Salt Lake City
residence (Tr. 45). This evidence would reflect income attributable to Mrs. Muir of $2,920
per month, not including interest and dividend income which totalled $2,162 in 1989. (Ex.
25) This is clearly a significant increase in light of the fact that she testified she was earning
nothing at the time of the entry of the decree.
The Finding which attempts to justify the court's failure to consider this additional
income is Finding no. 16 which concludes that the rental on the Salt Lake residence is
insufficient to pay expenses, thereby resulting in a loss. This finding is not supported by
either Mrs. Muir's testimony at page 46 of the trial transcript, or Exhibit 26. To the
contrary, Exhibit 26 which supports the court's Finding no. 17 that Mrs. Muir's monthly
expenses are $4,701 also includes expenses for the property being rented by her. What the
court failed to recognize, thus making its Findings clearly erroneous, is that this is a form of
double credit. Either the income and expenses relating to the Salt Lake residence are both
included in a determination of Mrs. Muir's financial condition and an ability to meet her own
financial needs OR both are excluded. The court's exclusion of the rental income for
purposes of determining Mrs. Muir's monthly income while at the same time considering the
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expenses she pays as a result of maintaining the property in a determination of her ability to
meet her monthly obligations is insupportable.
What the court also failed to consider is whether it was reasonable for Mrs. Muir to
maintain the Salt Lake residence at all. Although Finding no. 15 purports to address Mrs.
Muir's failure to sell the residence, which is supported by her testimony at page 179 of the
trial transcript, there is no finding by the court that Mrs. Muir's efforts at marketing the
home were reasonable or that her refusal to sell for $185,000 was reasonable. Findings on
these issues are essential before the court can accept without question Mrs. Muir's claimed
expenses.
Finally, although Mrs. Muir did testify in support of Finding no. 18 that she was not
able to enjoy the amenities which she enjoyed during the marriage, (Tr. 156-160) this is
testimony which is self-serving and must be analyzed with evidence relating to the standard
of living and financial ability of Mr. Muir at the time of trial to pay for such luxuries for
himself and Mrs. Muir. This ability is more specifically addressed below.
Therefore, the evidence in the record in support of the court's finding that there had
been no substantial change in Mrs. Muir's financial circumstances is inadequate as a matter
of law. The weight of evidence establishes that Mrs. Muir's income went from zero at the
time of the decree to at least $2920 per month at the time of trial on Mr. Muir's petition to
modify. Although Mrs. Muir claimed expenses of $4700 per month, the court failed to make
findings as to whether it was reasonable to maintain two residences. From this it is clear
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that the court's conclusion in Finding no. 19 that there had not been a substantial change in
Mrs. Muir's financial circumstances is clearly erroneous.
Similarly, the evidence in support of the court's findings as to Mr. Muir's financial
condition and his ability to pay alimony is insufficient to support them. The evidence
includes the following:
1.

Mrs. Muir called her financial expert, Mr. Peterson, whose testimony included

the following:
a.

That cash from the business would be available to Mr. Muir for

distribution as additional compensation; (Tr. 120)
b.

That the asset picture of Fairmont Bowl "didn't vary a lot." (Tr. 124)

c.

That the "debt [of Fairmont Bowl] had been coming down." (Tr. 127);

d.

That Mr. Muir's net income had increased $5,000. (Tr. 130, 135);

e.

That the gross receipts of the business had remained more or less the

same (Tr. 128); and
f.

That Mr. Muir's current wife's earnings came out of the "cash

account" of Fairmont Bowl to support the family. (Tr. 141).
2.

The financial statements referred to by the court in Finding no. 10, were

admitted into evidence as Exhibits 6, 7, 8, and 9.
3.

Mr. Bates, Mr. Muir's accountant, testified that cash left in the business would

be accessible to Mr. Muir as a shareholder to use in his discretion. (Tr. 40)
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4.

Mr. Muir testified that he had some discretion over how to spend his funds,

but that if he spent them "imprudently" the business would suffer. (Tr. 67)
5.

Mrs. Muir testified that there had been regular upgrades made to the business

during the marriage. (Tr. 58)
6.

Mr. Muir testified that his vehicle expenses, as well as the premiums for

automobile and health insurance were paid by the business. (Tr. 107)
7.

Mr. Muir testified that since entry of the decree he had taken one three-day

trip and one four-day trip to San Diego (Tr. 95), and spent a weekend in Jackson Hole. He
also testified that he had been in Hong Kong and Thailand in January of 1987 (Tr. 96), and
took a one-week trip to Europe in November of 1988. (Tr. 97)
This evidence is insufficient to support the court's findings, especially in light of the
evidence before the court to the contrary. To begin first with the improvements that had
been made to Fairmont Bowl, Mr. Muir testified that they were more or less cosmetic in
nature. (Tr. 65) In fact, Mr. Muir's accountant, Mr. Bates, testified that the fact that
depreciation was going down indicated that assets were wearing out and not being replaced.
(Tr. 25, Tr. 29) The depreciation in 1985 was $81,000; in 1990, it had been reduced to
only $33,000. (Tr. 64) Mr. Muir testified that the physical facility itself was more than
thirty years old, and that he had done lots of painting, and "some modernizing" as to seating
and carpets. (Tr. 65) He testified, however, that there had not been any substantial
replacement of equipment, either lanes, pinsetters, lighting or the roof (Tr. 65) over the last
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thirty years. Mr. Muir also testified that he planned to replace the lanes in the summer, but
could not afford to also replace the pinsetters. (Tr. 66)
Despite the language of Finding no. 9, Mr. Muir testified that there had been "no
substantial improvements" to the facility (Tr. 75), and also testified that, as to future
improvement, he would "have to do it in order to stay in business." (Tr. 78) It is clear that
the improvement Mr. Muir contemplated making to the business were not discretionary, but
were absolutely necessary to maintain the business as a competitive entity.
Similarly, there was limited testimony to support the finding that Mr. Muir's received
substantial benefits from the business. In fact, at the time of the decree, Mr. Muir owned a
Cottonwood Club membership that had been paid for by the business, at the time of the trial
on his Petition, he was a member of the Ft. Douglas Country Club at his own personal
expense. (Tr. 68-69, Tr. 95). At the time of the decree, Mr. Muir's expenses for a Porsche
911 SC were paid by the business (Tr. 67), as were his vehicle and health insurance
premiums. (Tr. 107). By the time of the hearing on his Petition, his expenses for his Chevy
Blazer were paid by the business, as were his vehicle and health insurance premiums. (Tr.
107) Mr. Muir no longer owned either an airplane or a boat, as he had at the time of the
decree (Tr. 68), and testified that he would characterize his lifestyle at the time of trial as
"substantially less" than it had been at the time of the decree of divorce. (Tr. 70)
As with Mrs. Muir, many of the benefits Mr. Muir enjoyed at the time the parties
were divorced had been significantly reduced or eliminated altogether, and that was the
evidence before the court at trial. This was due to the fact that the net income of the
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business, before compensation to Mr. Muir and before depreciation costs, had gone down
significantly according to Mr. Bates, the accountant for the business.
Just as in the court's analysis of the evidence relating to Mrs. Muir's financial
condition, the findings relating to Mr. Muir's financial condition and ability to pay alimony
are not supported by the evidence. Its conclusion that there had not been a substantial
change of circumstances in Mr. Muir's financial condition is clearly erroneous and must be
vacated.
Instead, the evidence establishes that there was a material change of circumstances to
support the lower court's first decision in this case. Specifically, Mr. Muir's income at the
time of the divorce was $118,577, and this is the income on which his alimony obligation
was established. His income at the time of the Petition had been reduced to $81,635. The
net profits of the business, before his compensation, had decreased by approximately 7%,
due to the increased expenses while gross receipts remained the same. It was necessary and
not discretionary for Mr. Muir to make substantial improvements to the business to maintain
it in a competitive condition. Finally, it was clear that neither party was able to maintain the
standard of living they had enjoyed during the marriage. As a result, the lower court's
reversal of its earlier decision must be vacated, and at the very least, remanded with specific
instructions to enter Mr. Muir's supplemental findings and an appropriate order consistent
therewith.
Likewise, the evidence in the record is inadequate to support Finding no. 22 and its
conclusion that Mr. Muir had the ability to assist Mrs. Muir in the payment of attorney's
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fees. Specifically, the weight of the evidence as to Mrs. Muir's financial needs, her
earnings, and Mr. Muir's ability to pay is contrary to this finding. It is therefore grossly
erroneous and must be vacated and remanded with specific instructions to enter an order
requiring each party to pay their own attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION
The lower court's findings and order in this case are fatally defective for two major
reasons. First, the court failed to make findings mandated by this Court on remand.
Second, the findings which were made by the court are against the clear weight of the
evidence. Instead, the record suggests that the lower court interpreted this Court's order on
remand as an order to simply reverse its earlier decision, rather than make additional
findings in support of it. Given the lower court's eagerness to enter Mrs. Muir's proposed
findings and order, and its failure to comply with this Court's mandate on remand, this Court
should vacate the lower court's decision and enter its own order after consideration of both
parties' motions submitted after remand and Mr. Muir's objections to Mrs. Muir's proposed
findings. Then, this case should be once again remanded, but only for the sole purpose of
requiring the lower court to enter Mr. Muir's supplemental findings and an appropriate
order.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of July, 1994.
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN

HELEN E. CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant.
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DIVORCE

30-3-5

30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 230, § 4 repeals
these sections, as last amended by L. 1989, ch.
104, §§ 2 to 5, providing for the appointment,

authority, duties, and jurisdiction of court commissioners, effective April 23, 1990.

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health
care of parties and children — Division of debts
— Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — Termination of alimony —
Nonmeritorious petition for modification — Meritorious petition for modification [Effective until
January 1, 1994].
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties.
The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental
care insurance for the dependent children; and
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which p^rty is responsible for the payment
of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or
incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide
the day care for the dependent children, hecessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the distribution of the property and obligations ior debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other
members of the immediate family, the COUH shall consider the best interest of
the child.
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if
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30-3-5

HUSBAND AND WIFE

the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his
rights are determined.
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouSe
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or association is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
(7) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the
reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or
defended against in good faith.
(8) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order
by a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted
by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because
of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation.

Disposition of property — Maintenance and
health care of parties and children — Division of
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction —
Custody and visitation — Termination of alimony
— Nonmeritorious petition for modification [Effective January 1, 1994].
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties.
The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital,
and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment
of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or
incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders;
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A,
Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and
(e) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or after
January 1, 1994, that are subject to income withholding, an order assessing against the obligor an additional $7 per month check processing fee to
be included in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of Recovery
Services within the Department of Human Services for the purposes of
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30-3-5

income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4
and 5.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of
the child.
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if
the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his
rights are determined.
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or association is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
(7) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or
defended against in good faith.
(8) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order
by a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted
by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because
of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L.
1909, ch. 109, § 4; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S.
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3;
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch.
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1;
1991, ch. 257, § 4; 1993, ch. 152, § 1; 1993,
ch. 261, § 1.
Amended effective January 1, 1994. —
Laws 1993, ch. 261, § 1 amends this section
effective January 1, 1994. See the amendment
note below.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment,, effective April 29, 1991, inserted "debts

or obligations" in the introductory paragraph
of Subsection (1), added Subsection (lKc), and
inserted "and obligations for debts" near the
end of Subsection (3).
The 1993 amendment by ch. 152, effective
May 3, 1993, substituted "members of the immediate family" for "relatives" and "best interest" for "welfare" in Subsection (4); substituted
"shall" for "may" and inserted "or defended
against" in Subsection (7); added Subsection
(8); and made stylistic changes.
The 1993 amendment by ch. 261, effective
January 1, 1994, inserted "or becomes" in Sub-
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Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse
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Compensation Act is to provide financial
security to the injured employee during the
period of disability. State Tax Comm'n v.
Industrial Comm'n, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah
1984); Wilstead v. Industrial Comm'n, 17 Utah
2d 214, 407 P.2d 692, 693 (Utah 1965);
Crosland v. Board of Review, 828 P.2d 528,
530 (Utah App. 1992). This purpose has no
application in the case of inmates, because their
financial security does not change with the
occurrence of a disability. An inmate's earning
capacity is already diminished by virtue of his or
her incarceration. Further, the inmate does not
depend on his or her ability to work to provide
food, shelter, or medical care. These are
provided by the prison system regardless of
ability to work.
Workers' compensation is centered on the
relationship between employer and employee.
The "essence of a workers' compensation system
is that it is a mutual arrangement of reciprocal
rights between an employer and employee
whereby both parties give up and gain certain
advantages/ Bingham v. Lagoon Corp., 707
P.2d 678, 679 (Utah 1985). Although prisoners
may participate in various types of prison work
programs, this participation does not create the
same "mutual arrangement of reciprocal rights''
upon which the workers' compensation system
is based. The primary purpose of the association
between the prison system and the inmate is
incarceration, not employment. Franks, 7 F.3d
at 972.
In light of these purposes, we hold that
inmates were not afforded employee status under
the Workers' Compensation Act previous to the
amendment. Thus the amendment excluding
inmates from the statutory definition of
"employee" is a clarification, not a change, and
should be applied retroactively. Accordingly,
Kofoed is not entitled to workers' compensation
benefits and we affirm the decision of the
Industrial Commission.
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
I CONCUR:
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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publication in the Pacific Reporter.
JACKSON, Judge:
Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc.
(Oneida) challenges the trial court's dismissal of
breach of contract, breach of warranty, and
negligence claims against Metalclad Insulation
Corporation (Metalclad). Oneida specifically
disputes the findings of fact upon which the trial
court based its dismissal. Because Oneida has
failed to marshal all the evidence in support of
those findings, we refuse to consider its
challenge and summarily affirm the trial court's
dismissal.
BACKGROUND2
In 1981 Roth Company (Roth) contracted to
design and build the shell of a cold storage
warehouse in Salt Lake City, Utah for
Oneida/SLIC (SLIC). In connection with the
development of the warehouse, SLIC entered
into a lease agreement with Oneida, under which
Oneida agreed to lease approximately 65,000
square feet of warehouse space. As part of the
lease agreement, Oneida agreed to supply all
insulation and vapor barrier materials necessary
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for construction of the warehouse's insulated
areas.
To fulfill its lease obligation, Oneida entered
into two separate contracts with Metalclad,
under which Metalclad agreed to supply the
insulation materials to be used for the warehouse
and to supervise the installation of those
materials.
Oneida filed a third-party complaint against
Metalclad to recover damages resulting from
defects in the warehouse's insulated concrete
floor slab system.3 The concrete floor cracked,
buckled, and broke up, both during and after
construction. Oneida claimed that Metalclad had
breached express and implied warranties relating
to the floor insulation that Metalclad had
supplied.
The trial court found that Oneida failed to
prove Metalclad had breached either of the
contracts or had breached express and implied
warranties relating to the insulation products.
The trial court also found that Oneida failed to
prove Metalclad was involved in designing the
floor slab system. Finally, the trial court found
that Oneida failed to prove Metalclad negligently
caused or contributed to the damages which
Oneida sustained. Accordingly, the trial court
dismissed all of Oneida's claims against
Metalclad. Oneida now appeals that dismissal.
APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO MARSHAL
THE EVIDENCE
Oneida presents six issues in its brief, four of
which are indisputably issues of fact and two of
which Oneida characterizes as issues of law.
The first issue that Oneida characterizes as one
of law challenges the trial court's denial of
damages resulting from alleged breaches of
contract and warranties. The trial court's denial
of Oneida's claim for damages, however, simply
followed its finding that Metalclad did not
breach its contracts or warranties. The second
issue that Oneida characterizes as one of law
challenges the trial court's ruling that Metalclad
was not jointly liable with Roth. The trial
court's determination that Metalclad was not
jointly liable, once again, simply followed its
finding that Metalclad was not negligent. In
other words, the trial court's dismissal of
Metalclad's damages and liability claims resulted
from the trial court's findings of fact and not
from its application, interpretation, or choice of
law. Thus despite Oneida's characterization, all
the issues presented on appeal dispute the trial
court's findings of fact.
Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts'
factual findings lightly. We repeatedly have set
forth the heavy burden appellants must bear
when challenging factual findings.
To
successfully appeal a trial court's findings of
fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's
advocate.
"[Attorneys) must
extricate
[themselves] from the client's shoes and fully
assume the adversary's position. In order to
properly discharge the [marshaling] duty . . . ,
the challenger must present, in comprehensive
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and fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports the
very findings the appellant resists." West Valley
Gty v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315
(Utah App. 1991); accord In re Estate of
Bartell, 776 P.2d 885. 886 (Utah 1989); State v.
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987);
Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d
29, 36 (Utah App. 1993); Online Corp. v.
Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App.
1993). Once appellants have established every
pillar supporting their adversary's position, they
then "must ferret out a fatal flaw in the
evidence" and show why those pillars fail to
support the trial court's findings. West Valley
Gty, 818 P.2d at 1314. They must show the
trial court's findings are "so lacking in support
as to be 'against the clear weight of the
evidence,' thus making them 'clearly
erroneous.'" Bartell, 776 P.2d at 886 (quoting
Walker, 743 P.2d at 193).
This rigorous standard reflects the doctrine
that appellate courts "do not sit to retry cases
submitted on disputed facts." Bartell, 776 P.2d
at 886. Accordingly, "[w]hen the duty to
marshal is not properly discharged, we refuse to
consider the merits of challenges to the findings
and accept the findings as valid." Mountain
States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d551,
553 (Utah App. 1989).
Oneida has failed to marshal the evidence in
support of the trial court's factual findings.
Rather than bearing its marshaling burden,
Oneida has merely presented carefully selected
facts and excerpts of trial testimony in support
of its position. Such selective citation to the
record does not begin to marshal the evidence;
it is nothing more than an attempt to reargue the
case before this court—a tactic that we reject.
Commercial Union, 863 P.2dat36; Online, 849
P.2d at 604. Because Oneida has failed to
marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's
findings, we hold that those findings are
accurate and affirm the trial court's dismissal
based on those findings.
As we decline to consider the merits of
Oneida's appeal, we take the occasion to further
articulate our rationale behind the marshaling
requirement. We recognize that requiring
appellants who challenge trial courts' factual
findings first to marshal all the evidence in
support of those findings and second to
demonstrate why that evidence remains
insufficient to support those findings is a
rigorous standard. Nonetheless, this strict
requirement both grows from and nurtures two
interrelated court objectives: efficiency and
fairness.
The deference we afford to trial courts'
findings is based on and fosters the principle
that traditional fact finders, whether judges or
juries, are better equipped to consider, weigh,
and assess the evidence that litigants bring
before the courts. Efficient resolution of disputes
demands that, unless the facts found by the trial
court are clearly erroneous, they will be upheld
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on appeal. In short, "[w]e do not sit to retry the
facts/ Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d
789, 800 (Utah 1991). Successful challenges to
findings of fact thus must demonstrate to
appellate courts first how the trial court found
the facts from the evidence and second why such
findings contradict the weight of the evidence.
These demonstrations in appellants' briefs not
only avoid retrying the facts but also assist us in
our decision-making and opinion-writing, thus
increasing our efficiency.
Additionally, the deference we afford to trial
courts' factual findings is based on and fosters
the principle that appellants rather than appellees
bear the greater burden on appeal. When
appellants do not marshal the evidence in
support of disputed findings, they place
appellees or respondents in a precarious
position. Prudent appellees likely will not rely
solely on an assertion that the appellant has
failed to marshal the evidence; rather, appellees
are compelled to perform the marshaling process
to protect their position. In short, appellees are
constrained to do the appellant's work, usually
at considerable time and expense.4 When
appellants challenge findings of fact, fairness
requires that they bear the costs of
demonstrating how the trial court found those
facts from the evidence and why those findings
contradict the weight of the evidence. The
marshaling requirement, therefore, enhances
both fairness and efficiency as appellate courts
hear appeals of trial court rulings.
CONCLUSION
Because Oneida has failed to marshal the
evidence in support of the factual findings which
it disputes, we decline to reach the merits of its
appeal. We hold that the trial court's findings of
fact are accurate, and accordingly we affirm the
trial court's dismissal of Oneida's claims against
Me talc lad.
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
WE CONCUR:
James Z. Davis, Judge
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
1. Senior Judge Regnal W. Garff, acting pursuant to
appointment under Utah Code Ann. §78-3-24(10)
(1992).
2. The parties do not dispute the following statement
of the case.
3. SLIC filed the original complaint against Roth for
breach of contract, negligence, and breach of
warranties. At trial the court entered a judgment
against Roth for $1,909,401.57plus interest and costs.
Roth does not appeal that judgment.
4. In the instant case, Metalclad's attorneys admirably
marshalled the evidence to protect their client on
appeal. That evidence supports the trial court's
findings.
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Roy B. MOORE,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
and Cross-Appellant,
v.
Lorna B. MOORE,
Defendant, Appellant,
and Cross-Appellee.
No. 910174-CA
FILED: April 6, 1994
Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Scott Daniels
ATTORNEYS:
John Walsh, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Clark W. Sessions, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Davis.
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
Lorna B. Moore appeals from the trial court's
order granting Roy B. Moore's petition to
modify the parties' divorce decree. Principally,
Mrs. Moore complains that the trial court erred
in rinding a substantial change in her material
circumstances and in reducing her alimony
award from $1050 per month to one dollar per
month three years after the filing of the present
action. Mr. Moore has filed a cross-appeal
claiming the court erred in continuing alimony
at $1050 per month for three years. We reverse
and remand for reinstatement of the original
alimony award.
FACTS
The parties were married in Elko, Nevada, on
March 25, 1964, and had three children during
the course of their sixteen-year marriage. All
three children have reached majority. In 1980,
the parties entered into a stipulation and
property settlement agreement, which became
the basis for a divorce decree entered on
December 23, 1980. At the time of the divorce,
the parties had an adjusted gross income of
$40,996, the majority of which was Mr.
Moore's income as Mrs. Moore was employed
part-time for five dollars an hour. At the time
the decree was entered, the parties had discussed
Mrs. Moore's plan to recertify as # school
teacher or to obtain a master's degree in
sociology.
Pursuant to the decree, Mr. Moore was
required to pay $1150 per month in alimony
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ing, the Utah Supreme Court observed that
"[e]very parent has the duty to support the
children he has brought into the world.
This duty is inalienable and he cannot rid
himself of it by purporting to transfer it to
someone else, by contract or otherwise." 4
Id. at 128-29. Sentry relies on this statement, and the Gulley court's further observation that
the just and logical consequence of the
duty of parents to support their children
is that if they are left in need and a third
party provides them necessities, he is
subrogated to the child's right and may
obtain reimbursement therefor.
Id.
Sentry's reliance on Gulley is, however,
misguided because in Gulley, the court
clearly reasoned that recovery against the
father for necessities provided to his children by a third party was permissible because the father's failure to pay on-going
child support as specified in the divorce
decree left the children "in need." See
Gulley, 570 P.2d at 129. See also id.
(Wilkins, J., dissenting) (pointing out that
state's theory was that father had failed to
pay child support "as ordered in the decree "). Moreover, the ex-husband's liability was limited to the amount of monthly
child support which was specified in the
decree. See 570 P.2d at 129. Gulley, then,
has no application to cases involving a noncustodial parent's obligation to pay for necessities provided to his children, except as
to parents who have not paid their child
support as ordered.
In this case, Sentry never even addressed
the extent of defendant's child support obligation. Nor does Sentry make any contention that defendant's child support obligation has not been fulfilled in accordance
with the divorce decree. Thus, the principles enunciated in Gulley have no application to the present case.
4. In Gulley, the children's mother and father
divorced, and the decree of divorce awarded
custody of the parties' four children to their
mother, together with $50 per month support
for each child and $50 per month for alimony.
After several years of making regular support

A--*

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment
appealed from is affirmed.
BENCH and BILLINGS, JJ., concur.

Marita MUIR, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Michael D. MUIR, Defendant
and Appellee.
No. 900603-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 12, 1992.
Former husband brought motion to
modify alimony he was required to pay
former wife. The Third District Court,"
Salt Lake County, Homer F. Wilkinson, J^
entered order modifying parties' decree of
divorce and reducing amount husband was
required to pay from $1,500 to $900 I
month and ordered husband to pay $3,000
of wife's attorney fees. Wife appealed;
The Court of Appeals, Garff, J., held that
(1) remand was required to enable trill
court to make specific findings in regardi
to husband's income from closely held cor*
poration, and (2) trial court abused its dtf
cretion in reducing attorney's fees payabli
to wife from a sum of more than $15,000 w
$3,000 without a finding that the reductioi
was warranted, requiring remand.
Remanded.
1. Divorce <S=>164
Trial court has discretion to modfa
divorce decree after it has determined tig
payments, the father entered into an agreeing
with the mother whereby he agreed to P t f * J
$10,000, which was to be prepayment of MM
re rn
his obligations under the decree, in
^ SS
release of those obligations. See Gullefi&n
R2d at 128.
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there has been substantial change of material circumstances subsequent to the decree, not contemplated at time of decree.
2. Divorce <s»239
When a spouse owns a closely held
corporation, including a professional corporation, trial court must do mor^ than rely
only on spouse's stated income when determining the spouse's ability to pay alimony.
3. Divorce <3=>245(2)
Temporary increase or decrease in payor's income does not necessarily constitute
substantial change in circumstances, for
purposes of modification of divorce decree.
4. Divorce <s=»245(2)
Finding that assets of marriage had
been divided equally upon divorce was relevant on motion to modify alimony payable
under divorce decree to extent it established baseline from which court could determine whether substantial change had occurred.
5. Divorce <s=>245(2)
Finding of increase in wife's income
and decrease in husband's income, without
more specificity, does not necessarily support conclusion of substantial change in
circumstances, for purposes of petition to
modify alimony payable under divorce decree.
6. Divorce ®=>287
Remand was required to enable trial
court to make adequate findings, supported
by sufficient evidence, regarding whether
material circumstances of parties had substantially changed in ways not contemplated by original divorce decree such that
modification of decree could be warranted,
where court had not made sufficient intermediary findings before making a bottom
•foe finding regarding husband's income, in
that husband was involved in closely held
corporation and court did not explain why
kttsband's income significantly decreased
Wen his ownership in business increased,
•M court did not consider evidence that
**poration substantially reduced its liabili£ * » o r whether husband benefitted beyond
* w y earned from corporation.

7. Divorce <s=>223
District court has discretion to order
either party to pay other party's attorney
fees in divorce action, including fees incurred in modification proceedings and in
appeals. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-3.
8. Divorce <s=*224
In order to award attorney fees in divorce action, trial court must find requesting party is in need of financial assistance,
requested fees are reasonable, and other
spouse has ability to pay. U.C.A.1953, 303-3.
9. Divorce <S=>227(1), 287
Trial court abused its discretion in reducing attorney's fees payable to wife from
a sum of more than $15,000 to $3,000 without a finding that the reduction was warranted, requiring remand. U.C.A.1953, 303-3.

Suzanne Marelius (argued), Littlefield &
Peterson, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and
appellant.
Duane H. Gillman, Leslie J. Randolph
(argued), McDowell & Gillman, P.C., Mary
J. Woodhead, Watkiss & Saperstein, Salt
Lake City, for defendant and appellee.
Before GARFF, JACKSON and
RUSSON, JJ.
OPINION
GARFF, Judge:
Appellant Marita Muir (Wife) appeals an
order modifying the parties' decree of divorce. The modification reduced appellee
Michael D. Muir's (Husbanjl) obligation to
pay alimony from $1,500 to $900 a month.
The modification also ordered Husband to
pay $3,000 of Wife's attorney fees, which
amounted to approximately $15,000. We
reverse and remand.
FACTS
The parties were married for more than
twenty years before their divorce on September 16, 1985. At the time of the modifi-
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cation hearing, five years later, all three of
the parties' children had attained majority.
At the time of the divorce, the court
found, pursuant to the parties' stipulation,
that each party had received an equal property distribution. The distribution provided that Husband would receive all the common stock owned by the parties in Fairmont Bowl and that Wife would receive the
parties' residence. The court ordered Husband to assume liability for loans incurred
by Fairmont Bowl and it ordered Wife to
assume the mortgage debt on the residence.
The court ordered Husband to pay Wife
alimony of $1,500 per month "until [Husband's] obligation . . . is terminated because of the death of one of the parties, the
remarriage or cohabitation by [Wife] or
because of further order of the court based
on some other valid and lawful reason to
terminate alimony pursuant to the laws of
the state of Utah." The court ordered each
party to pay his or her attorney fees and
costs "resulting from and incident to this
action."
During most of the parties' marriage,
and at the time of the divorce, Husband
derived all of his income from his majority
ownership of Fairmont Bowl. At the time
of the divorce, he owned 78% of the company's stock, with the remainder held by his
father. Since the divorce, Husband's ownership increased to 96.61%, as a result of
gifts of stock from his father. The parties'
children own the remaining stock.
In August 1989, five years after the divorce, Husband petitioned for modification
of the alimony order, claiming a substantial
change in material circumstances since entry of the decree. He sought a reduction
in alimony for one year, followed by complete termination.
Husband based his petition for modification on a claim that, since the divorce, his
income had decreased and Wife's income
had increased.
Specifically, Husband
claimed that while gross revenues of his
business had remained consistent, expenses
had increased, depreciation had decreased,
and his business needed extensive capital
investment.

A ^

Husband also claimed Wife's income hid
substantially increased since the time ef
the divorce. He presented evidence shoiK
ing that her income from her seasonal^
as a flight attendant averaged $1,400 g r S
per month in the first nine months of 199(1
At trial, Husband's accountant testified
that Husband had total discretion overttf
amount of money he took as compensate
each year. Wife's accountant testified that
Husband's calculations were misleading
Wife's accountant also testified thatHtt3
band received benefits in addition to hto
stated salary including automobile tfe
penses, travel expenses, health insui*nca|
auto insurance, costs, country club costL
and tax deferred benefits including pensQ
contributions. Husband also benefitted
from the fact that his new wife drew^tf
salary from the corporation.
' ,ft^
At trial, the court permitted Wife's attOfi
ney to proffer testimony regarding thi
amount and reasonableness of attornqr
fees. Husband's attorney did not object'
The proffer included itemizations and alfldavits of Wife's former attorneys. Wife's
attorney proffered that total fees and coftl
incurred in defending the petition for modt
fication were $13,179, along with estimated
trial fees of $2,600. She then concluded
her proffer: "I have been a practicing it*
torney for ten years in this area. And that
the rate I am charging is commensurate'
with my experience and expertise in the
field." Again, Husband's attorney did not
object nor did he cross-examine Wife's a |
torney. Wife's attorney requested leave w
supplement the record with a final item!**
tion of the trial fees. Husband's attorney
proffered fees of $6,000 for the modification action.
In October 1990, the trial court concluded
there had been a substantial change to
material circumstances justifying modificar
tion of the original alimony award, To*
court based its conclusion on the following
findings: (1) the assets of the marriage had
been divided equally; (2) Wife's annual to*
come had increased from $12,000 to f l y
000; (3) Husband's annual income hadd*
creased from $118,600 to $81,600; and (4)

MUIR . MUIR

Utah

739

Cite as 841 P2d 1 6 (UtahApp. 1992)

Husband needed to reinvest in the business:
[Husband] in the near future is
going to have to put Some big—well,
some money into his business in order to
stay up with the competition.
The court then found:
[Wife] has incurred substantial legal
fees approximating $15,000 for her representation in these proceedings. [Husband] has incurred legal fees for representation in these proceeding of $6,000.
The Court further concludes that
[Husband] should be required to pay his
own attorney's fees in these proceedings
and that he should also be required to
pay to [Wife] for the use and benefit of
her counsel in the matter the sum of
$3,000.
Wife appals, claiming the court erred in
determining there had been a substantial
change in material circumstances because
the underlying findings were inadequate
and erroneous. She also claims the court
abused its discretion in awarding a subitantially smaller attorney fee than that
requested. We reverse and remand.
MODIFICATION OF ALIMONY
[1] A trial court has discretion to modify a divorce decree after it has determined
that there has been a substantial change of
material circumstances subsequent to the
decree, not contemplated at the time of the
decree. Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251
(Utah App.1989), cert dismissed, 795 P.2d
1139 (Utah 1990); Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985) (per
curiam).
We first consider whether the findings
adequately support the determination that
there has been a substantial change in material circumstances. In this regard, "the
trial court must make findings on all material issues, and its failure to delineate what
circumstances have changed and why these
changes support the modification made in
the prior divorce decree constitutes reversible error unless the facts in the record are
dear, uncontroverted and only support the
Judgment." Whitehouse v. Whitehouse,
790 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah App.1990); accord

Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah
1987); Throckmorton v. Throckmorton,
767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah App.1988); Utah
R.Civ.P. 52(a). Further, findings "should
be sufficiently detailed and include enough
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Acton, 737 P.2d
at 999; accord, Gardner v. Gardner, 748
P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988) (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah
1979)); Whitehouse, 790 P.2d at 61.
CLOSELY-HELD CORPORATIONS
Determining Husband's income is complex because he derives his income from a
closely-held corporation.
[2] This court and the supreme court
have held that when a spouse owns a closely-held corporation, including a professional
corporation, a trial court must do more
than rely only on the spouse's stated income. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d
1072, 1076 (Utah 1985); Christiansen v.
Christiansen, 667 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah
1983).
In order to determine whether the
court's findings were adequate, we consider what constitutes "all material issues."
Obviously, all material issues must relate
to "a substantial change of circumstances
subsequent to the decree, that was not
originally contemplated within the decree
itself," Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251
(Utah App.1989) (citing Woodward v.
Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985)
(per curiam)), and "must relate to the basis
upon which the original award was made
by the trial court." Id. at 1251-52.
Because of the nature of alimony, the
substantial change goes to financial and
property interests and circumstances of the
parties. Montoya v. Montoya, 696 P.2d
1193, 1194-95 (Utah 1985).
[3] A temporary increase or decrease in
the payor's income does not necessarily
constitute a substantial change. English
v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 412 (Utah 1977)
(substantial change does not occur when
party "experiences unusual prosperity dur-
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ing one year"). Nor does a temporary
change in the payee's income necessarily
constitute a substantial change.- Ring v.
Ring, 29 Utah 2d 436, 511 P.2d 155, 159
(Utah 1973); Felt v. Felt, 27 Utah 2d 103,
493 P.2d 620, 624 (1972).
For example, in Jones, the supreme court
held the trial court erred in considering
only the husband's stated income. 700
P.2d at 1076. The trial court should have
considered that the husband "had control
over the entire profit, but chose to take
only half of it as personal income and to set
the rest aside for reinvestment in the business." Id. The court noted the proper
balance between the need to reinvest in the
business and the need to pay alimony:
If these capital needs [of the business]
are a result of discretionary decisions of
the husband to expand and improve the
business, rather than to maintain it in its
present condition, then to permit him to
divert income into the business at the
expense of his ex-spouse's support needs
would be to permit him to enrich himself
at her expense.
Id. In Christiansen, the court held that
"where an ex-husband has a wholly-owned
corporation, a trial court may consider both
his individual income and the corporation's
income in considering a petition by the divorced wife for modification of alimony and
child support." 667 P.2d at 594. The
Christiansen court affirmed a finding that
the payor benefitted more than his stated
corporate salary indicated. Id. The court
affirmed a finding that the payor benefitted personally from expenditures of the
business for an employee benefit program
and auto allowance. Id. at 593-94; see
also, Naylor v. Naylor, 700 P.2d 707, 709
(Utah 1985) (trial court correctly considered
benefits to payor such as bonuses, pension
contributions, and profit-sharing accounts);
Hinckley v. Hinckley, 815 P.2d 1352, 1354
(Utah App.1991) (court "not bound by [business owner's] allocation of business income
in determining whether he is still able to
pay alimony.").
Trial courts may consider many factors
when evaluating a business owner's income, see, e.g., Sorensen v. Sorensen, 839
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P.2d 774, 777 (Utah 1992) (accounts receivables may be used to pay alimony); Naylor,
700 P.2d at 709 (may consider corporate
benefits such as bonuses, pension contributions, and profit-sharing accounts); English, 565 P.2d at 412 (may consider business owner's historical earning ability to
determine income); Rasband v. Rasband,
752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah App.1988) (may
upwardly adjust husband's stated income
because of "his ability to expense some
personal use items through his business.").
Here, the court made four findings to
support its conclusion that there had been a
substantial change in material circumstances: (1) the assets of the marriage had
been divided equally; (2) Wife's income had
increased; (3) Husband's income had decreased; and (4) Husband needed to reinvest in the business.
[4] The first finding does not relate directly to a substantial change. However, it
is relevant to the extent it establishes a
baseline from which the court can determine whether a substantial change has occurred. See, e.g., Higley v. Higley, 676
P.2d 379, 382 n. 1 (Utah 1983).
[5] The next two findings relate directly to a substantial change in circumstances.
But these findings, of an increase in Wife's
income and a decrease in Husband's income, without more specificity, do not necessarily support a conclusion of a substantial change in circumstances. See, e.g.,
Ring, 511 P.2d at 159; Felt, 493 P.2d at
624.
[6] In a case such as this, where Husband's finances and the finances of the
business are intertwined, a bottom line
finding regarding Husband's income does
not "include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the court's ultimate conclusions were reached." Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah
App.1990). For example, some important
subsidiary facts the court should have considered include: why Husband's income
significantly decreased when his ownership
in the business increased by eighteen percent; evidence that the company substan-
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tially reduced its liabilities in 1988; evidence of Husband's net worth statements
in credit applications made since the decree;
and, testimony regarding "loans to shareholders" on the books of the business
amounting to cash not included in Husband's compensation.
The trial court also failed to find whether
Husband benefitted beyond the salary
earned from the closely-held corporation.
The record indicates that Husband received
travel and auto allowances, auto and life
insurance, tax deferred benefits including
pension contributions, and that his new
wife drew a salary from the corporation.
See Naylor, 700 P.2d at 709. As in Christiansen, any such expenses paid by the
corporation should be added to the stated
salary.1 Christiansen, 667 P.2d at 593.
Obviously, all of these "business expenses"
contributed to the bowling alley's decreased profitability since the divorce.
The finding that Husband would soon
need to reinvest in the business is problematic because the court failed to find
whether the reinvestment constituted a
"discretionary decision . . . to expand and
improve" or whether the reinvestment was
to "maintain it in its present condition."
Jones, 700 P.2d at 1076.
Accordingly, we remand for the trial
court to enter adequate findings, supported
by sufficient evidence, regarding whether
the material circumstances of these parties
have or have not substantially changed in
ways not contemplated by the original decree such that modification of the decree
may be warranted.2
ATTORNEY FEES
Wife claims the court abused its discretion in awarding only $3,000 in attorney
fees when the amount proffered was much
greater.
1. We do not suggest that the new wife's income
should be added to Husband's stated salary.
However, the new wife's income most likely
relieves Husband of a portion of his stated expenses.
2.

In the event the trial court on remand determines there has been a substantial change in
material circumstances not contemplated by the
decree, the court must then make specific and

[7] The district court has discretion to
order either party to pay the other party's
attorney fees in a divorce action. Utah
Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1989); Maughan v.
Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah App.
1989). Section 30-3-3 includes attorney
fees incurred in modification proceedings
and in appeals. See Maughan, 770 P.2d at
162.
[8] In order to award attorney fees, the
trial court must find (1) the requesting
party is in need of financial assistance; (2)
the requested fees are reasonable; and (3)
the other spouse has the ability to pay.
Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 840 (Utah
App.1991); Haumont v. Haumont, 793
P.2d 421, 425 (Utah App.1990); Riche v.
Ricke, 784 P.2d 465, 470 (Utah App. 1989).
In determining the reasonableness of attorney fees, the court may consider
the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the
case, the reasonableness of the number
of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services, the amount involved in the
case and the result attained, and the
expertise and experience of the attorneys
involved.
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1336
(Utah App. 1988) (quoting Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985)).
[9] Where "the evidence supporting the
reasonableness of requested attorney fees
is both adequate and entirely undisputed,
. . . the court abuses its discretion in
awarding less than the amount requested
unless the reduction is warranted" by one
or more of the established factors. Martindale v. Adams, 111 P.2d 514, 517-18
(Utah App.1989).
adequate findings reflecting the English factors
to support a modification of the alimony award.
That is the court must make findings regarding
(1) Wife's ability to provide for herself the standard of living contemplated in the decree; (2)
Husband's ability to pay the full alimony
amount; and (3) Wife's needs. English, 565
P.2d at 411-12.
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Here, the court permitted Wife's attorney to proffer testimony regarding the
amount and reasonableness of attorney
fees. Husband's attorney did not object.
The court then found that Wife incurred
legal fees amounting to approximately
$15,000. It ordered Husband to pay only
$3,000 of those fees, offering no explanation for the reduction.
Other than its previous finding relating
to an increase in Wife's income, the court
failed to find whether Wife needed financial assistance. In addition, while the court
made general findings regarding Husband's income, it made no findings regarding Husband's ability to pay Wife's attorney fees. Moreover, despite evidence proffered by Wife's attorney, the court failed
to make findings regarding the reasonableness of the fees.

issue of attorney fees for the court to make
specific findings regarding Wife's financial
need, Husband's ability to pay, and regarding the reasonableness of the fees requested, both for the modification hearing and
this appeal.

Because the proffered evidence of Wife's
attorney fees was adequate and entirely
undisputed, the court abused its discretion
in reducing the requested amount from a
sum of more than $15,000 to $3,000 without
a finding that the reduction was warranted
by one of the established factors.
In addition, our remand of the alimony
issue may have an effect on the award of
attorney fees. See, e.g., Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 77 (Utah App.1991).
We therefore remand the issue of attorney fees for the court to make specific
findings regarding Wife's financial need
and Husband's ability to pay. In the event
the court finds both need and ability to pay,
it must then make independent findings
regarding the reasonableness of all fees
and costs of all the attorneys Wife has
employed to defend the petition to reduce
and eliminate alimony, including fees incurred on appeal.

DEAN JITTER REYNOLDS, INC.,
Ralph Pahnke, and John Does 1
Through 25, Defendants and Appellees.

JACKSON and RUSSON, JJ., concur.
(o
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Anna Lee ANDERSON, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v,

No. 920228-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 13, 1992.
Beneficiary of express trust sued
stockbroker and brokerage firm alleging
improper distribution of trust assets. The
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, J.
Dennis Frederick, J., dismissed complaint
on ground that beneficiary did not have
standing to sue. Beneficiary appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that
beneficiary could prove facts showing she
had standing to bring suit for the improper
distribution of the stock sufficient to withstand motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim.
Reversed and remanded.

CONCLUSION
We remand the issue of alimony for the
court to make specific findings, supported
by sufficient evidence, regarding whether
the material circumstances of these parties
have or have not substantially changed in
ways not contemplated by the original decree such that modification of the decree
may be warranted. We also remand the

M?>

1. Appeal and Error <3=>863, 919
When reviewing motion to dismiss
based on failure to state a claim, appellate
court must accept material allegations that
the complaint is true, and the trial court's,,
ruling should be affirmed only if it clearly
appears the complainant can prove no set
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59(a) (1987) (applicable to criminal proceedings by virtue of Rule 81(e)). Thus, if
jurors were to agree that a verdict would
be based on a "divine sign," a Ouija board
answer, or some fortuitous event, such a
verdict, in my judgment, would constitute a
denial of due process and the right to trial
by jury.
The trial judge ruled that Rule 606(b) of
the Utah Rules of Evidence (1987) prohibited him from considering the allegations in
the affidavit submitted by defendant1
Rule 606(b) governs the admissibility of
juror testimony and affidavits for purposes
of impeaching a jury verdict The majority
sustains that ruling, holding that "prayer
and supposed responses to prayer are not
included within the meaning of the words
'outside influence'" as used in Rule 606(b).
I believe the majority fails to draw a
critical distinction between the legitimacy
of jurors' seeking divine assistance in accurately and dispassionately weighing the evidence and the illegitimacy of jurors' abdicating their sworn duty to decide the case
on the evidence and instead relying on
some supposedly divine sign. Although
"[a] juror is fit to serve if he or she can
impartially weigh the evidence and apply
the law to the facts as he or she finds
them," as the majority observes, the fact
appears to be that the juror in question did
not impartially weigh the evidence and apply the law to the facts, but disregarded
the evidence and the law and ruled on the
basis of an "outside influence." Accordingly, the trial court could have relied on
the affidavit under Rule 606(b) for the purpose of deciding that a hearing on the
allegations should have been held. It is of
particular significance that the juror in
question is alleged to have been "one of the
leaders" during the jury deliberations.
1. Rule 606(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence
(1987) states:
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a
verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify
as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to
the effect of anything upon his or any other
juror's mind or emotions as influencing him
to assent to or dissent from the verdict or
indictment or concerning his mental proA

1 A

In my view, a verdict based on chance,
like a verdict based on a supposed divine
sign, falls within the meaning of the terms
"extraneous prejudicial information" and
"outside influence," as those terms are
used in Rule 606(b) of the Rules of Evidence. If, therefore, the allegations of the
affidavit are true, defendant would be entitled to a new trial under Rule 24 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
I would remand the case to the trial
court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the jurors decided the case
on the evidence or whether there was reliance on factors outside the record.

Verlora CARLTON, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v,
Frank Hayden CARLTON, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 860247-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 3, 1988.

Husband appealed from order of the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Jay
E. Banks, J., distributing property in divorce proceeding. The Court of Appeals,
Greenwood, J., held that trial court's failure to make finding as to value of parties1
assets in making distribution constituted
cesses in connection therewith, except that a
juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether
any outside influence was improperly brought
to bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit
or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received for these
purposes.
(Emphasis added.)
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reversible error requiring remand for entry
of additional findings.
Vacated and remanded.
Jackson, J., dissented and filed an opinion.
Divorce «=>253(4), 286(9), 287
In divorce proceeding, trial court's failure to make findings as to value of parties'
assets in making equitable distribution of
property constituted reversible error requiring remand for entry of additional findings; trial court on remand was required to
make findings as to value of parties1 various assets, if trial court were to award
wife any of husband's premarital property,
trial court would be required to enter findings explaining circumstances justifying
such an award, and trial court was required
to indicate whether it was valuing parties'
assets as of time of divorce or as of time of
separation.
B.L. Dart (argued), John D. Parken, Salt
Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
Paul H. Liapis, John C. Green (argued),
Gustin, Adams, Kasting & Liapis, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.
Before DAVIDSON, JACKSON and
GREENWOOD, JJ.
OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Defendant, Frank Hayden Carlton, appeals the trial court's property distribution
in a divorce proceeding, claiming that the
trial court did not enter sufficient findings
of fact and inequitably awarded property.
We vacate the property award and remand.
Plaintiff, Verlora Carlton, and defendant
were married on June 18, 1979, separated
in December 1984 and divorced in August
1986. At the time of trial, plaintiff was
forty-nine and defendant was sixty-four.
Throughout the marriage, defendant
worked as a certified public accountant and
earned over $100,000 gross annual income
during most of the marriage. Plaintiff did
not work during the marriage, but before

the marriage she had operated a cosmetology shop and earned approximately $1,100
gross income per month. At the time of
trial, plaintiffs gross income was $800 per
month.
Defendant testified at trial that his premarital assets totalled $761,925 while plaintiff testified that she had $24,935 in assets
at the time of the marriage. Both parties
presented exhibits regarding the values of
their assets. Defendant claimed to have
gained only about $75,000 in additional assets during the course of the marriage.
However, plaintiff claimed that she was
entitled to assets totaling $201,591.85 in
value as her share of the parties' marital
estate. Without placing a value on the
items constituting the parties' assets, the
court found that "the marital appreciation
in the assets which the parties acquired
during the marriage and/or maintained
during the marriage, totals $255,827.00."
The court then subtracted plaintiffs premarital assets of $27,228 from that amount
and awarded plaintiff one-half of the adjusted marital estate of $228,099 plus the
value of h6r premarital assets, for a total
of $144,277.
On appeal, defendant claims the trial
court erred in failing to make sufficient
findings of fact as to the value of the
parties' assets and that the property distribution is inequitable because it distributes
a substantial portion of defendant's premarital assets t6 plaintiff.
In divorce proceedings, the trial court is
given considerable discretion in fashioning
an equitable property distribution, Jones v.
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985);
Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750 P.2d 615, 618
(Utah Ct.App.1988), and its findings will
not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669, 670
(Utah CtApp.1987). The trial court must
make findings on all material issues, and
its failure to do so constitutes reversible
error "unless the facts in the record are
'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment' " Acton t>. JB. Deliran, 737 P.2d
996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Kinkella v.
BaugK 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)). In
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addition, the findings must be sufficiently
detailed and consist of enough subsidiary
facts to reveal the steps the court took to
reach its conclusion on each factual issue
presented. Acton, 737 P.2d at 999; Lee v.
Lee, 744 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah CtApp.
1987). Finally, the trial court's failure to
include property valuations in divorce actions may constitute an abuse of discretion
sufficient to require remand for determination. Jones, 700 P.2d at 1074; Boyle, 735
P.2d at 671.
This divorce proceeding involved numerous different assets including at least thirty different stocks and bonds, six savings
accounts, four checking accounts, several
bronze statutes, the parties' residence,
IRAs and a Keogh plan. Defendant's exhibits valued the assets at the time of the
marriage and at the time of the separation,
which was a year and a half before the
divorce decree was entered. Defendant's
exhibits also separately itemized the securities acquired during the marriage. Plaintiffs proposed property distribution listed
only a portion of the parties' assets apparently valued as of the trial in December
1985.
The testimony at trial and the exhibits
clearly indicate that the parties hotly contested the values of many of the assets.
For example, the parties' exhibits differ on
the value of the E.F. Hutton Investment
account. Plaintiffs exhibit values the E.F.
Hutton Investment account at $113,000,
while defendant's exhibit indicates that the
account decreased $62,400 in value during
the parties' marriage and was worth only
$29,217 at the time of the separation. Defendant conceded, however, that the E.F.
Hutton Investment account increased in
value from $29,217 at the time of the separation to $113,000 at the time of the trial
but testified that he believed the estate
should be valued as of the date the parties
separated. The trial court found that the
parties acquired "stocks and bonds in an
investment account with E.F. Hutton Investment Company" during the marriage
but did not place a value on the account
In addition, the findings do not state
whether the court valued the E.F. Hutton
Investment account as of the time of the

separation or as of the time of the divorce.
The values of many other assets were also
controverted.
Based on the trial court's findings, we
cannot determine how the court arrived at
its conclusion that the marital assets had
appreciated by $255,327 during the marriage. The trial court did not clearly state
which assets were marital or premarital
nor did it value all of the individual assets.
The general rule is that
Premarital property . . . may be viewed
as separate property, and in appropriate
circumstances, equity will require that
each party retain the separate property
brought to the marriage. However, the
rule is not invariable. In fashioning an
equitable property division, trial courts
need consider all of the pertinent circumstances.
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah
1987).
Because we cannot determine how the
court arrived at the amount of appreciation
of the marital estate during the parties'
seven year marriage, we are also unable to
determine whether the court allowed each
party to retain all or some portion of his or
her separate property. Although the findings indicate that the parties were
d
most of what was claimed as pre. ital
property, the findings do not specify
whether some of the assets, such as the
savings and checking accounts, were premarital property. For example, the court
found that the parties had acquired "numerous bank accounts" during the marriage, but did not specify if all of the bank
accounts distributed in the divorce were
acquired during the marriage. In the
event the court awarded plaintiff some of
defendant's premarital property, the court
must follow Burke and make findings
which explain the circumstances warranto
ing an award of defendant's premarital
property to plaintiff.
In addition, we cannot determine from
the court's findings if the parties' assets
were valued at the time of the divorce
decree or at the time of the separation.
Generally, assets are valued at the time of
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the divorce decree. Berger v. Berger, 713
P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985); Peck v. Peck,
738 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah Ct.App.1987).
"However, where one party has dissipated
an asset, hidden its value, or otherwise
acted obstructively, the trial court may,
under its broad discretion, value the property at an earlier date, i.e., separation."
Id. The findings in this case do not indicate whether the court valued the assets at
the time of the divorce or the time of the
separation. However, it appears from the
evidence received by the court that some of
the assets were only valued as of the time
of the parties' separation.
Further, the facts in the record are not
"clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment" Acton, 737 P.2d at 999. The dissent urges application of the methodology
utilized in Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564
(Utah 1985). In Olson, the court failed to
make a finding of the wife's financial needs
in determining an alimony award. The
Utah Supreme Court, nevertheless, affirmed the alimony award, finding it was
appropriate if the court assumed the wife's
claimed financial need, which the husband
disputed, was true.
The Olson approach is not applicable in
this case where the parties disputed many
values, and we would have to speculate on
the trial court's view as to the value of
each asset Unlike Olson, we cannot simply assume as true one disputed value.
Instead, we must speculate on numerous
disputed facts. In addition, the Olson
Court found that if it added a finding of
financial need in the amount claimed by the
wife, the Court would not disturb the alimony award. This case differs because we
cannot determine if the property distribution was fair and equitable without a valuation of each asset and a designation as to
which property was premarital and marital.
Furthermore, the difficulty in applying Olson is compounded by the court's failure to
distinguish between separation and time of
trial valuations.
Therefore, we hold that the trial court's
failure to make findings as to the value of
the parties' assets constitutes reversible er-

ror requiring this Court to remand for entry of additional findings. On remand, the
court must make findings as to the value of
the parties' various assets, and, if the court
awards plaintiff any of defendant's premarital property, the court must enter findings
which explain the circumstances justifying
such award. See Burke, 733 P.2d at 135.
In addition, the court's findings must indicate whether the court is valuing the parties' assets as of the time of the divorce or
as of the time of the separation.
Judgment vacated as to the property
award and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
DAVIDSON, J., concurs.
JACKSON, Judge (dissenting):
I depart from the majority at two points.
First, I am concerned that remand of this
case will impose an unnecessary burden on
the judicial system and the parties. The
remand will require a new trial unless the
judge who originally heard this matter, former District Court Judge Jay E. Banks, can
be recalled from the ranks of the retired.
Another trial judge will find it impossible
to dredge from the depths of the record all
the specific findings ordered by the majority.
Secondly, we need not impose any burden upon Judge Banks or one of his colleagues in this case. The law is clear in
Utah that, in order to permit appellate review, a trial court's distribution of marital
assets whose values are contested by the
parties should be based upon specific written findings as to what those values are.
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah
1985). In Jones, the Court concluded that
the remedy o( remand was appropriate because "[i]f the trial court accepted one set
of values, the [appellant] wife was clearly
awarded too little; if another set was
adopted, it is possible that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion." Id
Four months after Jones, the Utah Supreme Court decided Olson v. Olson, 704
P.2d 564 (Utah 1985), in which the appellant ex-wife challenged the amount of alimony awarded her. She claimed that the
A
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trial court had failed to consider her financial condition 'and needs, one of three
factors that must be considered by the trial
court in fixing the amount of alimony. Id.
at 566. The unanimous Court agreed that
the trial court's findings on this factor
were inadequate, but it did not end its
analysis there and remand to the district
court Instead, it accepted her evidence on
these issues as true and reached her substantive claim, ultimately affirming the
amount of the trial court alimony award:
Turning to the record in the absence of
sufficient findings, we find conflicting
evidence on some factual issues material
to a determination of the wife's financial
condition and needs. Nevertheless, even
accepting as true, for purposes of review, the [appellant] wife's evidence on
these issues, we find no abuse of discretion in the amount of alimony awarded.
Id. at 567. This approach to the disposition
of the appeal makes sense. The trial
court's findings must be supported by the
evidence. Accordingly, the best an appellant could do—if adequate findings were
made at trial or on remand—is to have the
court accept his or her evidence on the
disputed point If even that version of the
facts does not justify disturbing the trial
court's judgment, then there is no reason
for the appellate court to send the case
back for more specific findings that will
not ultimately change the outcome of the
case.
The Utah Supreme Court applied this
commonsense approach again in Claus v.
Claus, 727 P.2d 184 (Utah 1986). As in the
case before us, the appellant husband in
Clans challenged the trial court's distribution of marital property. He complained
that the trial court had failed to make
findings as to the values of each party's
premarital assets and the increase of those
values during the marriage. The trial
court had totalled the equities of all the
parties' properties and then awarded nearly
half of the total to each. Id. at 185. In its
per curiam opinion, the Utah Supreme
Court did not automatically remand for
specific findings on the disputed values of
individual assets. It looked to the entire
record and affirmed the trial court's prop-

erty distribution, concluding that it was
"eminently fair" to the appellant Id.
Subsequent to Olson and Claus, the
Utah Supreme Court explicitly held that
the failure to make findings on all material
issues is reversible error unless the facts in
the record are clear, uncontroverted, and
capable of supporting only a finding in
favor of the judgment Acton v. Deliran,
737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). In applying
the Acton standard in appeals challenging
the property distribution in a divorce decree, the Court has not indicated that the
sensible appellate practice used in Olson is
to be thrown out the window, resulting in
meaningless and burdensome remands to
the district courts.
In Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076
(Utah 1988), for example, the appellant
wife challenged the trial court's complete
failure to assign values to, and to distribute as marital property, the husband's retirement account and medical assets where
the parties' figures varied considerably.
The Court remanded Gardner for the entry
of specific findings, concluding that it could
not perform its reviewing function and determine whether the parties' property was
equitably distributed without more detailed
findings regarding the valuation of assets.
Id at 1080. Just as it had in Jones, the
Court pointed out that the award to respondent Mr. Gardner of all his retirement
funds and medical assets might ultimately
turn out to be proper and equitable if the
trial court adopted his evidence as to their
value. Id But the appellate court might,
presumably, agree with appellant Mrs.
Gardner that the trial court's property
award was inequitable if the trial court
findings adopted her evidence of their values.
No such problem is presented by this
case. Even if we accept appellant's version
of what the value of the marital estate and
the individual asset valuations should have
been, the overall marital property distribution is eminently equitable to him. Therefore, additional findings are not needed to
support affirmance of the trial court's
award.
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The majority unfortunately elevates
form over substance by slavishly and, I
believe, misguidedly applying Acton, without regard for appellant's only substantive
issue on appeal, namely, whether the trial
court's apportionment of the marital property "was clearly unjust or a clear abuse of
discretion." Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1078.
The majority insists on having additional
and more specific findings in order to understand the trial court's ultimate total of
$228,099 in marital property, one-half of
which was awarded to each party. All they
really want are some intermediate mathematical calculations.1 To justify their remand, my colleagues have clothed this case
in the raiment of complexity. "[E]ven Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like
one of these." Matthew 6:29. But we
need not undress the entire record to expose the equity of the trial court's ultimate
marital property finding.

total of $144,277 was awarded to Mrs. Carlton, i.e., $114,049 (one-half the adjusted
marital estate) plus her premarital property
of $27,228. In Finding 14, the court subtracted from this figure $12,041 in assets
she took at the time of separation, leaving
her a balance of $129,236. The remaining
marital assets are identified as specific
bank and investment accounts with fixed
values from which Mrs. Carlton received
the balance of her marital property award,
including $99,124.29 from their E.F. Hutton
account.3

Judge Banks's findings contain an orderly, step-by-step route of factual conclusions
that leads to the ultimate disposition without detour. Finding 6 identifies Mrs. Carlton's premarital property, which the court
awarded to her. Finding 13 valued her
property at $27,228. Finding 7 identifies
Mr. Carlton's premarital property, which
the court awarded to him; no value was
fixed. Findings 8 through 12 identify the
properties which the parties acquired during the course of their marriage and make
some specific offsetting awards, leaving an
adjusted marital estate of $228,099.2 A

Viewed in light of the values assigned by
Mr. Carlton, the trial court's property distribution is patently equitable. Appellant
elected to use values calculated as of-the
date of the parties' separation, although
assets are generally valued as of the time
of the divorce decree. See Berger v. Bergert 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985). Mr.
Carlton's values were submitted via Exhibit 35D, consisting of underlying itemized
schedules summarized onto a front sheet.
His summary valued his premarital property at $761,925 at the time of marriage,
increasing to $837,732 at separation, for a
total $75,807 increase during the marriage.
But, assigning his specified values to the
assets the court awarded him yields a total
value of $889,000.4 Thus computed, he received $127,000 more than his premarital
value. This compares favorably with the
court's award to him of $114,049, one-half
of the adjusted marital estate.

1. The majority states, "we cannot determine
how the court arrived at its conclusion that the
marital assets had appreciated by $255,327 during the marriage." The trial court valued Mrs.
Carlton's premarital property at $27,228 and
awarded it to her. The majority has included
her premarital property in the "appreciation."
The trial court, in finding 13, found a marital
estate of $228,099 and awarded Mrs. Carlton
one-half, i.e., $114,048.

awarded to her); $14,000 (for the 1985 Lincoln
awarded to him); and $113,000 (for the value at
trial of the E.F. Hutton account created from
his premarital savings). The $228,000 balance
($403,000 minus $175,000) divided equally between the parties represents the value of all the
remaining marital assets, including a one-half
interest in land in Carbon County, numerous
liquid asset accounts, and several bronzes and
sculptures.

2. The values used by Judge Banks in reaching
this total are contained in Mrs. Carlton's Exhibit
14P, her itemization of the "assets of parties"
and her asserted values for each asset, totalling
$403,000. She excluded her premarital property and his premarital Bear Lake home. Judge
Banks subtracted $175,000 from her total, comprised of the following items: $38,000 (for the K
Street home awarded to him as premarital property); $10,000 (for the Saratoga, Wyoming lot

3. As acknowledged by the majority, Mr. Carlton
testified that the E.F. Hutton account balance
was $113,000 at time at trial. Mrs. Carlton's
evidence fixed the same value.
4. This figure gave Mr. Carlton the benefit of a
claimed $100,000 loss of value on his Bear Lake
home, i.e., from $300,000 to $200,000 during the
marriage.
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Acceptance of Mr. Carlton's own values
reveals no serious inequity or abuse of
discretion in the property distribution as
far as he is concerned. Although Mrs.
Carlton might have some reason to complain, she has not cross-appealed to challenge the trial court's award.8 The findings show that the trial court considered
each item of property. The premarital
property was delineated and awarded respectively to each party. Hers was assigned a total value; his was not Individual valuations of their premarital assets
were not material since the ultimate issue
was the equitable division of marital property, not premarital property.
Where the asset values claimed by appellant at trial show he received an equitable
share of the marital property and no clear
abuse of discretion is otherwise proven, we
ought to defer to the trial court's property
distribution. The judgment of the trial
court should be affirmed.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Jon C. VASILACOPULOS, Defendant
and Appellant
Nos. 870291-CA; 870507-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 3, 1988.
Rehearing Denied July 19, 1988.

mer F. Wilkinson, J., denying his motion to
withdraw guilty plea. The Court of Appeals, Bench, J., held that record did not
establish that defendant understood possibility of consecutive sentences when he entered plea of guilty.
Reversed, convictions vacated, and
matter remanded.

1. Criminal Law e»1149
Denial of motion to withdraw guilty
plea will be reversed only when it clearly
appears that the trial court has abused its
discretion. U.C.A.1953, 77-13-6.
2. Criminal Law ^273.1(4)
Trial court may not rely on defense
counsel or executed affidavits to satisfy
specific requirements of admonishing defendant before accepting plea of guilty.
U.C.A.1953, 77-35-ll(e).
3. Courts <&=>100(1)
Where defendant entered his guilty
plea prior to date of Supreme Court decision requiring strict compliance with admonition requirements, the strict compliance
standard did not apply and test for reviewing efficacy of plea hearing was whether
the record as a whole affirmatively established that defendant entered his plea with
knowledge and understanding of its consequences. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-ll(e).

4. Criminal Law <s=*273.1(4)
Defendant's statement that he had
gone over affidavit with his attorney and
understood the contents of that guilty plea
affidavit and that he understood that he
was waiving his right to trial, to confront
Defendant appealed from order of the witnesses, and to appeal to a higher court
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Ho- did not establish that defendant understood
5. The property distribution is also eminently
fair when reviewed on the basis of marital income. The majority identifies a seven-year
marriage and acknowledges that Mr. Carlton
"earned over $100,000.00 gross annual income
during most of the marriage." Their tax returns
show that his adjusted gross income ranged
from a high of $117,000 to a low of $88,000.
The parties maintained a frugal lifestyle, except
for regular business trips that were expensed
through his CPA business. Most of the approxi-

mately $700,000 of income earned during the
marriage was invested in liquid assets. The
court found an accumulation of only $228,000.
I find it inconceivable that the remaining $472,000 of income was spent by these two people for
consumables during their short marriage. Mrs.
Carlton was awarded no alimony. Her $114,000 property award, about which she has not
complained, appears fair, equitable and even
generous to Mr. Carlton's side of the ledger.
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The Board denied appellant parole and set
the next parole hearing date for August
1992.
On October 16, 1991, appellant filed a
Complaint for Extraordinary Writ seeking
habeas corpus relief. The district court
granted the State's motion to dismiss the
complaint

given circumstance may vary, "but assuredly, the parole board is not outside the
constitutional mandate that the actions of
government must afford due process of
law." Id. (footnote omitted). The process
due at a board of pardons hearing can only
be determined "after the facts concerning
the procedures followed by the board are
flushed [sic] out." Foote, 808 P.2d at 735.

ISSUE

[4] The record consists only of a complaint for habeas corpus relief and memoranda in support of and in opposition to a
motion to dismiss. There is nothing in the
record showing what transpired at appellant's hearings before the parole board or
the trial court. Moreover, the trial court
summarily dismissed his petition without
entering any findings or stating the legal
basis for its judgement. The record does
not reveal any basis for a habeas corpus
determination. "[I]n the absence of an adequate record, this court is unable to conduct a meaningful review of the board's
actions or of [appellant's] due process
claims." Id.

Did the Board of Pardons' procedures
and regulations deny appellant's right to
state and federal due process at the July
1991 parole hearing?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing an appeal from a dismissal of a habeas corpus petition, "we
survey the record in the light most favorable to the findings and judgment; and
we will not reverse if there is a reasonable
basis therein to support the trial court's
refusal to be convinced that the writ should
be granted." Medina v. Cook, 779 P.2d
658, 658 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added).
ANALYSIS
[1,2] For appellant to succeed on his
due process claim under the United States
Constitution, he must first show he was
denied a constitutionally protected liberty
interest. See Gray v. Department of
Emp. Sec., 681 P.2d 807, 816 (Utah 1984).
The presence of a parole system does not,
by itself, "give rise to a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in parole release."
Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369,
373, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 2418, 96 L.Ed.2d 303
(1987). For a liberty interest to arise, there
must first be statutory language limiting
the parole board's discretion. Hatch v. Deland, 790 P.2d 49, 50-51 (Utah App.1990).
Utah's parole statute contains no such limitations. Id. at 51; Utah Code Ann. § 7727-9(1) (Supp.1992).
[3] Under the Utah Constitution, the
due process clause of article I, section 7 is
"comprehensive in its application to all activities of state government." Foote v.
Utah Bd. of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734, 735
(Utah 1991). What process is due in any
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Accordingly, we remand to the district
court for a hearing to develop the record
and for entry of findings in support of its
determination.
GREENWOOD and RUSSON, JJ.,
concur.
lO
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GRANITE MILL, a Utah Corporation,
Defendant and Appellee.
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 9, 1993.
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sales contract The District Court, Salt
Lake County, Timothy R. Hanson, J., entered judgment in favor of buyer, and seller appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, P.J., held that even if overtime
charges incurred by buyer as result of seller's late delivery of shutters were consequential, rather than incidental damages,
buyer was entitled to recover offset for
those charges.
Affirmed.
1. Appeal and Error <s=>757(3)
On appeal from judgment entered in
action for breach of sales contract, seller
failed to marshal the evidence, as required
to challenge trial court's findings of fact on
appeal, where seller merely selected facts
from trial that were most favorable to its
position, then reargued those facts on appeal.
2. Sales <^418(16.1)
Even if overtime charges incurred by
buyer as result of seller's late delivery of
shutters were consequential, rather than
incidental damages, buyer was entitled to
recover offset for those charges, where
seller was aware that buyer was working
under deadline at time it entered into contract. U.C.A.1953, 70A-2-715, 70A-2715(2), 70A-2-717.
Gerald M. Conder, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and appellant.
Bruce T. Jones and Paul M. Simmons,
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellee.
Before BILLINGS, GREENWOOD and
RUSSON, JJ.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
Plaintiff Ohline Corporation filed this action to collect the balance of $9405 due for
window shutters delivered to Granite Mill.
Granite Mill acknowledged it received the
shutters but claimed it was entitled to an
offset equal to the $9405 unpaid purchase
price because Ohline had breached the parties' contract by delivering the shutters

late. The trial court, after a trial on the
merits, awarded Granite Mill the offset.
We affirm.
FACTS
We recite the facts in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings. State v.
Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah 1990).
In April 1989, Granite Mill entered into a
contract with the Las Vegas Hilton Corporation to remodel suites in the Las Vegas
Hilton Hotel. The contract required the
work be completed on or before August 4,
1989. If Granite Mill did not complete
work by the contract date, Granite Mill was
required to pay the rental value of the
suites until they were available.
Granite Mill contracted with Ohline to
manufacture window shutters for the remodeling project. Granite Mill repeatedly
communicated to Ohline the strict August
4, 1989 completion deadline and the parties
structured the contract accordingly. On
May 5, 1989, Granite Mill sent Ohline a
purchase order for 288 shutters. Due to
disagreement on payment terms, Ohline
cancelled the May 5th prder five days later.
After agreeing on credit and payment
terms, the purchase order was reinstated
and a sales contract was finalized. The
final contract specified the shutters would
be delivered to Granite Mill "by the third
week in July—Hopefully Mid-Month."
The trial court interpreted this to mean the
shutters would be finished and ready for
shipment to Granite Mill no later than July
22, 1989, the last day of the* third week of
July.
On June 6, 1989, Granite Mill faxed Ohline the final shutter measurements, and
Ohline began work. On Saturday, July 22,
1989, Ohline delivered eighty-six or eightyseven shutters, approximately one-third of
the order. The balance of the order was
shipped via commercial carrier in two separate shipments. Thirty-three shutter units
were shipped on July 25, and the balance
was shipped on July 26. Granite Mill did
not receive all of the shutters until the
afternoon of July 28, 1989, six days late.

A -1%
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As a result of the late shipments by
Ohline, Granite Mill was forced to work 435
hours of overtime so the shutters could be
installed by the August 4th deadline. The
435 overtime hours equated to $9405 of pay
above Granite Mill's regular hourly rates.
Ohline invoiced Granite Mill $45,328.62 for
the shutters. Granite Mill timely paid all
of the invoice minus the $9405 which it
claimed as an offset for damages caused by
the late delivery.
Ohline subsequently filed suit against
Granite Mill seeking recovery of the $9405.
The trial court concluded Ohline had
breached its agreement to deliver the shutters by July 22, 1989 and Ohline's breach
had damaged Granite Mill in the amount of
$9405. Thus, the court entered judgment
in favor of Granite Mill.
On appeal, Ohline claims the trial court
erred in allowing Granite Mill to offset the
$9405 arguing the trial court's findings of
fact were in error. It further claims Granite Mill was not entitled to an offset because the court erred in considering the
overtime wages as incidental damages under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-715 (1990).1

Utah's appellate courts have been clear
on the burden an appellant must meet
when challenging; a trial court's findings of
fact. To successfully challenge a trial
court's findings of fact on appeal, "[a]n
appellant must marshal the evidence in
support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial
court's findings are so lacking in support
as to be 'against the clear weight of the
evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.' " In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d
885, 886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v.
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)).
"If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the
record supports the findings of the trial
court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law
and the application of that law in the case."
Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199
(Utah 1991).

[1] As a threshold issue, Ohline challenges findings of fact made by the trial
court. Ohline claims the trial court erred
in finding that: (1) Ohline was aware of
Granite Mill's August 4, 1989 completion
deadline at the time they entered the contract; (2) Ohline agreed to have the shutters ready for shipment no later than July
22, 1989; (3) Ohline failed to have the materials ready for shipment on or before July
22, 1989; (4) Granite Mill was injured in the
amount of the overtime wages by the late
delivery; and, (5) Granite Mill made reasonable efforts to mitigate its damages.

Ohline has failed to marshal the evidence. Instead, Ohline has merely selected
facts from trial that are most favorable to
its position, and then reargued those facts
to this court on appeal. Such a tactic ignores "the rules designed to give stability
to jury verdicts." Hodges v. Gibson Prods.
Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991). Therefore, we accept the following dispositive
facts: (1) Ohline understood Granite Mill
had a strict August 4, 1989 deadline; (2)
both Ohline and Granite Mill understood
and agreed the shutters Ohline was furnishing were to be finished and ready for
shipment no later than July 22, 1989; (S)
Ohline did not have the shutters ready for
shipment by July 22, 1989; (4) Granite Mill
was damaged in the amount of $9405 for
overtime pay to install the late shutters;
and, (5) Granite Mill was diligent and made
reasonable efforts to mitigate its damages.

1. Ohline also asserts the late delivery was excused because Granite Mill contributed to the
delay. Ohline, however, raises this issue for the
first time on appeal.
To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a
party must timely bring the issue to the attention of the trial court, thus providing the
court an opportunity to rule on the issue's
merits. "Issues not raised in the trial court in

timely fashion are deemed waived, precluding
[the appellate court] from considering their
merits on appeal."
LeBaron & Assoc., Inc. v. Rebel Enter., 823 P.2d
479, 482-83 (Utah App.1991) (citations omitted)
(quoting Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 116 P.2d
653, 655 (Utah App.1989)). We therefore refuse
to consider the issue of excused delay for the
first time on appeal.

I. FAILURE TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE

A. 1\
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II. OFFSET
[2] Ohline next argues that even if we
accept the trial court's factual findings, the
trial court incorrectly applied Utah Code
Ann. § 70A-2-717 (1990)2 in concluding
Granite should receive an offset because of
Ohline's late delivery. Ohline argues the
overtime damages are not recoverable as
either incidental or consequential damages
as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-715
(1990).
This court reviews a trial court's conclusions of law for correction of error. In
short, "we accord conclusions of law no
particular deference, but review them for
correctness." Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). A trial
court's interpretation and application of a
statute, as in the instant case, presents a
question of law. State ex rel Division of
Consumer Protection v. Rio Vista Oil,
Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990); Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d
1033, 1038 (Utah 1989). Accordingly, we
review for correctness the trial court's determination that Granite Mill's overtime
damages were incidental damages under
section 70A-2-715, and thus were properly
offset pursuant to section 70A-2-717.
Whether Granite Mill's overtime damages are labeled as incidental or consequential is not important under the facts of this
case. Section 70A-2-715 provides:
(1) Incidental damages resulting from
the seller's breach include expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt,
transportation and care and custody of
goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or
commissions in connection with effecting
cover and any other reasonable expense
incident to the delay or other breach.
2. That section provides: 'The buyer on notifying the seller of his intentions to do so may
deduct all or any part of the damages resulting
from any breach of the contract from any part
of the price still due under the same contract."
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-717 (1990).
Ohline does not challenge the trial court's
application of section 70A-2-717, but rather
limits its appeal to whether the damages were
properly labeled incidental under Utah Code

(2) Consequential damages resulting
from the seller's breach include
(a) any loss resulting from general
or particular requirements and needs
of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which
could not reasonably be prevented by
cover or otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property
proximately resulting from any breach
of warranty.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-715 (1990). Under this statute, to recover incidental damages, a buyer must show the damages (1)
were incurred because of the breach, and
(2) were reasonable. James J. White &
Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial
Code § 6-5, at 266 (3d ed. 1988) (White &
Summers). In contrast, to recover consequential damages, the buyer must* establish: (1) causation, (2) foreseeability', (3)
reasonable certainty as to amount, and (4)
the buyer is not barred by mitigation doctrines. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2715(2); White & Summers § 6-5, at 266.
Ohline does not challenge Granite Mill's
right to an offset if the damages are properly characterized as incidental. The plain
language of section 70A-2-715, includes
overtime wages as "any other reasonable
expense incident to the delay or other
breach." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-715
(1990). Furthermore, although the caselaw
is limited, there is precedent for labeling
overtime damages as incidental. See Jay
V. Zimmerman Co. v. General Mills, Inc.,
327 F.Supp. 1198, 1205 (E.D.Mo.1971) (holding overtime damages incidental under
U.C.C. § 2-715); Bockman Printing &
Services v. Baldwin-Gregg, Inc., 213 111.
App.3d 516, 527, 157 Ill.Dec. 630, 638, 572
N.E.2d 1094, 1102 (1991) (concluding overtime damages may be either incidental or
consequential).3
Ann. § 70A-2-715 (1990). Accordingly, whether Granite Mill .properly notified Ohline of its
intention to deduct damages from the purchase
price as required by section 70A-2-717 is not at
issue.
3. But see Kabco Equip. Specialists v. Budgetel, 2
Ohio App.3d 58, 440 N.E.2d 611, 614 (1981)
(finding overtime conceivably recoverable as
consequential damages); Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Krieger, 710 S.W.2d 869 (Ky.App.
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Even if we were to accept Ohline's characterization of the overtime damages as
consequential, the result is no different.
Ohline contends the facts do not satisfy the
statute's foreseeability requirement for
consequential damages, because Ohline had
no reason to know of the August 4, 1989
deadline. This argument fails because the
trial court found Ohline was fully aware of
the deadline when they contracted with
Granite Mill, a finding we uphold. Therefore, even if Ohline is correct that Granite
Mill's overtime damages are consequential
rather than incidental, Granite Mill is still
entitled to the offset.
CONCLUSION
Because Ohline failed to satisfy its burden to marshal the evidence, we accept the
trial court's findings of fact. Furthermore,
Granite Mill was entitled to damages, and
therefore an offset, regardless of whether
the overtime damages are considered incidental or consequential under section 70A2-715. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
GREENWOOD and RUSSON, JJ.,
concur.
(O
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J. Lamar RICHARDS, Plaintiff
and Appellee,
v.
SECURITY PACIFIC NATIONAL BANK;,
Debra L. Youngman; Deborah Diamanti; Ameristar Financial Corporation;
Associates Financial Services Company, Inc.; First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., Defendants and Appellants.
No. 920679-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 9, 1993.
After property owner refinanced, holder of mechanics' lien brought suit contend1986) (recognizing trial court's award of overtime wages as consequential damages even

ing that it had priority over new mortgage
holder. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Pat B. Brian, J., found that
mechanics' lien had priority, and appeal
was taken. The Court of Appeals, Billings
P.J., held that under Utah's mechanics' lien
statutes, subsequent lender had constructive notice of intervening mechanics' liens
so that subsequent lender was not entitled
to use doctrine of equitable subrogation to
defeat mechanics' lien.
Affirmed and remanded.

1. Judgment <&=>181(2, 3)
Summary judgment is appropriate if
there are no genuine issues of material fact
and moving party is entitled to judgment as
matter of law.
2. Appeal and Error <3=>842(2), 863
Trial court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness, according
no deference to trial court's legal conclusions whether issue presented on summary
judgment is one of law or equity.
3. Subrogation <®=>1
Individual's access to equitable subrogation as remedy depends on principles of
justice, equity, and benevolence to be applied to facts of particular case.
4r Subrogation <s=>31(4)
"Equitable subrogation" allows creditor, who satisfies prior creditor's lien, to
acquire lien priority of prior creditor under
particular circumstances, although application of doctrine may be defeated by intervening rights which would be prejudiced;
equitable nature of doctrine prevents articulation of unwaivering rule that applies in
all cases.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
5. Subrogation <s=>31(4)
For purposes of determining whether
doctrine of equitable subrogation applies to
though labeling not challenged on appeal).
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HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247)
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Attorney for Defendant
Suite 722 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7444

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
MARITA W. MUIR,
DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR ORDER IN RE:
ENTRY OF SUPPLEMENTAL
FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL D. MUIR,

Case No, 844903928
Appeal No. 900603-CA

Defendant.

*
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Defendant, MICHAEL DOUGLAS MUIR, by and through his attorney,
Helen E. Christian, hereby moves this Court to enter the following
Findings of Fact to supplement the findings previously entered by
the Court subsequent to the trial held in this matter on October
11, 1990.

This motion is made pursuant to the direction of the

Utah Court of Appeals in its remand of the above-captioned matter
to this Court, as specifically set forth in the case of Muir v.
Muir, 841 P.2d 736 (Utah App. 1992).
Defendant submits the following Findings of Fact for the
Court's consideration and approval:

A-ifc
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FINDINGS OF FACT
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
I.
1.

Decrease in Defendant's Earnings

Defendant's gross earnings for the twelve-month period

ending June 30, 1985, were $118,577, and his gross earnings for the
twelve-month period ending June 30, 1990, were $81,635.

This

decrease is due to several factors related to the operation of
Defendant's business as more specifically

set forth in these

findings.
2.

Defendant's ownership in the business known as Fairmont

Bowl was 71% in 1985, at the time of the parties' divorce, and had
increased to 96% by the time of the trial on Defendant's Petition
for Modification.
3.

Defendant's increased stock ownership is due to gifts of

stock received by him from his father, with whom he has operated
the business for nearly thirty years.
4.

Despite

Defendant's

increased

stock

ownership,

Defendant's earnings from the business have decreased due to the
following factors:
(a)
the

net

Gross receipts from the business have decreased, and

income

to the

business, before

compensation

to the

Defendant, as reflected on Exhibit 3, went from $226,000 in 1985 to
$115,260 in 1990, a decrease of approximately 51%.

2

00212

(b)

Depreciation taken on assets in 1985 was $81,000,

which decreased to $33,000 in 1990 due to the fact that the assets
had been depreciated out and no capital purchases had been made for
the business.
(c)

The bowling industry has been in a slump for the

last few years, not only in the state of Utah, but nationally, and
Defendant's ability to maintain the gross receipts of the business
at approximately the same level since 1985 is primarily due to
increased prices for his regular customers.
(d)

The gross receipts of Fairmont Bowl decreased by

$45,000 from 1985 to 1990, and Defendant has had to increase the
services he provides to maintain his clientele and to justify the
increased prices he has had to charge.
5.

Defendant sold a home in 1988 and used some of the

proceeds from that sale to prepay an SBA loan of approximately
$15,000 owing by the business in order to save the business the ten
percent (10%) interest charges.
6.

Defendant has taken loans from the business, and has also

given loans to the business, and these loans were made with the
intent that they be repaid by the borrower.

The amounts owing by

Defendant to Fairmont Bowl are debts to be repaid, and not part of
his compensation from the business.
7.

Defendant

submitted

financial

statements

to banking

institutions for the purchase of obtaining credit and represented
3
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on those statements that his net worth had increased from a net
worth of $479,000 in 1986 to $542,000 in 1989, which increase is
attributable to Defendant's increased ownership in the business.
8.

Defendant receives certain benefits in addition to his

monetary compensation from the business, including the use and
operation of a Chevrolet Blazer, a credit card for the purchase of
gasoline,

membership

at

the

Fort

Douglas

automobile and medical insurance coverage.

Country

Club,

and

Although Defendant

received similar benefits from the business at the time of entry of
the Decree, the value of the benefits he receives have been reduced
from what they were at the time of the parties' divorce.
9.

Defendant's current wife also works in the business and

she receives a salary of $600.00 per month, and has occasionally
earned as much as $1,000 per month.

If she were unable to work in

the business, Defendant would need to hire an employee to assume
those duties.
10.

These factors are evidence that Defendant's earnings have

decreased since the Decree of Divorce, and constitute a substantial
and material

change of circumstances

sufficient

to warrant a

reduction of his alimony obligation.
II.

Defendant's need to make capital improvements
to maintain business in present condition

11.

The physical plant of the business was built in 1958.

12.

Defendant

has

painted

the

facility,

modernized

the

seating and replaced carpets, seating and ball racks, but has not
4
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made any substantial replacement of equipment, such as lanes,
pinsetters, or lighting for several years.
13.

The

thirty

two

(32)

lanes

at

Fairmont

Bowl

are

approximately thirty (30) years old, and need to be replaced, and
the cost of replacement for each lane is $35,000.
14.

Defendant needs to replace the lanes at Fairmont Bowl by

the summer of 1991 in order to stay in business.
15.

Defendant needs to make other substantial "big money"

investments into the business in order to remain competitive in the
bowling industry.
16.

Defendant's anticipated investments in the business are

neither discretionary nor with the intention of expanding the
business; rather, these anticipated investments are necessary to
maintain the present operation of the business and the viability of
Fairmont Bowl as a bowling center.
17.

These necessary expenditures will reduce the amount of

income available to the Defendant from the business.
18.

These factors are evidence that Defendant's earnings from

the business will not increase in the near future to a level that
he was earning at the time of entry of the Decree
as

such,

constitute

a

substantial

and

of Divorce, and,

material

change

of

circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification of Defendant's
alimony obligation.

5

A-3D

00215

III.
19.

Attorney's Fees

Plaintiff has gross earnings of $17,000 per year from her

employment, and also earns additional rental income from the home.
20.

Plaintiff has had to retain counsel to defend against

Defendant's Petition, and incurred attorney's fees in the amount of
$13,179 while she was represented by Matthew P. McNulty, and an
additional amount of approximately $2,600 while she was represented
by her present counsel.
21.

Defendant has incurred attorney's fees of approximately

$6,000.
22.

The

attorney's

fees

incurred

by

Plaintiff

for

representation by her present counsel are reasonable, in light of
her counsel's expertise and experience

the field.

The court

makes no finding as to the reasonableness of the fees incurred by
Plaintiff for representation by her previous counsel.
23.

Defendant has prevailed in part on his Petition and has

the ability to contribute towards the payment of Plaintiff's fees.
DATED this

14^

day of April, 1993.
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN

KSf

HELEN E. CHRISTIAN
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered a true and
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ORDER IN RE:
ENTRY OF SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT this

IH

day of April,

1993, addressed to:
SUZANNE MARELIUS
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
JAMES P. COWLEY
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, UT 84144
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K r i s t i n e Wimmer
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SUZANNE MARELIUS - 2081
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
MARITA W. MUIR,
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ORDER
IN RE: FOR ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER OF MODIFICATION
ON REMAND

Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL D. MUIRf
Defendant.

Case No. 844903928 DA
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson
ooOoo

The Plaintiff above-named by and through counsel Suzanne
Marelius hereby moves the above Court to enter the Findings of
Factf Conclusions of Law and Order on Defendant's Petition for
Modification on Remand which are supplemental to the original
Findings and Decree entered by the Court on October 26, 1990.
Plaintiff has prepared and filed the supplemental Findingsf and
Order pursuant to the instructions of the Utah Court of Appeals in
an opinion dated November 12, 1992, and asks that the Court review
and enter those, forthwith.
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays the above-entitled Court to
review and enter the "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order on Defendant's Petition for Modification on Remand" in the
above-entitled matter.
DATED this

/ /* day of May, 1993.
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON

SUZANNE MARELIUS
Attorney for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing, PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
ORDER IN RE: FOR ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER OF MODIFICATION ON REMAND, this
to:
Ms. Helen E. Christian, Esq.
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Suite 722, Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant
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/ /" day of May, 1993,

?!.-.£< Judicial D-strict

MAY 2 6 1993
; (Z

OaiKKf Clerk

SUZANNE MARELIUS - 2081
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
MARITA W. MUIR,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AFTER
REMAND

Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL D. MUIR,
Defendant.

Case No. 844903928 DA
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson
ooOoo

The Utah Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the
above-referenced case to the Third District Court on November 12,
1992 with instructions that the Court make specific findings,
supported by sufficient evidence regarding the issues of alimony,
substantial change in circumstances, and attorney's fees.

Having

reviewed the Court records and transcript herein, the Court issues
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on remand to
supplement the previous Findings entered in this case.

The Court

enters the following Findings of Fact as follows:

A-35
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties were married for more than twenty years

prior to their divorce on September 16, 1985.

The Defendant filed

a Petition to Modify alimony five years after the divorce on which
a trial was held October 11, 1990.
2.
stipulation

The
of

the

initial

divorce

parties

and

was

each

resolved

party

by

received

joint

an

equal

property distribution which provided in relevant part that the
husband

receive

all common

stock owned by the parties

in the

business known as Fairmont Bowl and that the wife receive the
parties'

residence.

The

husband

was

ordered

to

assume

the

liability for business loans incurred by Fairmont Bowl and the wife
was ordered to assume the mortgage debt on the residence.
3.

The

Defendant was

ordered

to pay

the

Plaintiff

alimony of $1,500 per month until her remarriage, cohabitation, the
death of one of the parties, or further order of the Court.
4.

During the majority of the parties' marriage and at

the time of the divorce, the Defendant derived all of his income
from his ownership of Fairmont Bowl and at the time of divorce
owned

78% of

the

stock

in

the

entity.

At

the

time

of

the

modification hearing his stock ownership had increased to 91.3%,
with the parties' children owned the remainder of the stock.

2
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5.
Defendant

In Augustf 1989, five years after the divorce the

petitioned

substantial
reduction

change
of

termination.

for

in

alimony

modification

material
for

of

alimony

circumstance

one

year,

claiming

and

he

followed

by

sought

a
a

complete

The Defendant based his petition on a claim that his

income had decreased and that the Plaintiff's income had increased.
A.
Findings on Changes in Circumstances Regarding
Earnings.
6.

The

Defendant

alleged

specific

Defendant's
changes

in

circumstances in that although his gross revenues from his business
had

remained

consistent,

that

decreased

and

his

expenses

had

increased,

his

business

needed

depreciation

had

capital

investment.

Defendant also alleged that the wife's income had

substantially increased by her earning $1,400 gross per month as a
flight attendant in the first nine months of 1990, as opposed to
$1,000 a month at the time of divorce.
7.

Plaintiff's accountant Mr. Randall Peterson, CPA,

analyzed seven years of tax returns from 1983 through 1989 filed by
the Defendant.

He testified that the returns showed an average

"pre-divorce" income of to Defendant $104,678 and an average "postdivorce" income of $104,188.

Accountant Peterson analyzed the

Defendant's "net spendable income" from 1983 to 1989 showing his
post-divorce average (excluding alimony payments), to be $69,194
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which was approximately $5,000 more than his before divorce average
of $64,819.
8.

The Defendant's accountant Mr. Ed Bates agreed with

Plaintiff's accountant that the gross revenues of the Fairmont Bowl
Corporation have been consistent and that it has been operated as
a Subchapter S Corporation since the parties' divorce.

On this

point, the accountants relied on the 1985 tax return for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1985 showing gross receipts to be $691,529 as
compared with gross receipts at the end of fiscal year June 30,
1990 where gross receipts were $645,102.
9.

The Defendant has made regular, annual improvements

to the Fairmont Bowl facility and had just finished computerizing
the facility, making it one of the most highly competitive in the
Salt Lake Market place and had also added new carpeting, new racks,
new seating and other improvements on a regular basis since the
divorce.
as well.

Defendant testified to the need for future improvements
Such capital

improvements

are

in the discretion

of

Defendant whose personal and business finances are intertwined.
10.

Since

the

divorce,

Defendant

has

prepared

four

separate financial statements for First Interstate Bank which show
that his total assets and net worth since entry of the divorce as
stated by him have increased from at least $715,580 in assets on
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the statement dated January 3, 1986 to $989,000 in assets on a
statement dated September 7, 1989.
11.

Both Plaintiff's and Defendant's accountants agreed

that due to the corporation's Subchapter S status, the Defendant
had total discretion over the amount he took as compensation each
year, in setting prices for his product, and in making capital
expenditures.
12.
expenses

The Defendant's business has paid for many personal

for the Defendant

and his family

including

operating

expenses and payments for his family car, health insurance, travel,
auto and life insurance, tax deferred benefits including pension
contributions, and benefits from his new wife drawing a salary from
the corporation.

The Defendant also receives the benefit of loans

to shareholders from corporate revenues.
13.

Based on the foregoing evidence, the Court does not

find that there has been a substantial change in the circumstances
surrounding Defendant's earnings since the parties divorce.

His

income

are

has

been

consistent

when

all

personal

benefits

considered and given the Defendant's discretion over allocating
income between personal and business uses, it is appropriate to
include all such personal benefits.

5
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B.
Findings on Changes in Circumstances Regarding
Income.
14.

The

Plaintiff's

lifestyle

has

Plaintiff/s

substantially

deteriorated since her marriage to the Defendant which consisted of
a

luxurious

lifestyle

and

no

financial

worries.

During

the

marriage the parties resided in a large home they built themselves
worth $370,000 at the time of the divorce.

The parties owned an

airplane, a boat and took regular trips abroad to various parts of
the world.
15.

It was undisputed that the Plaintiff's only work

during the marriage was at Fairmont Bowl where her wages were
approximately $l f 000 per month.

Since the divorce, Plaintiff had

difficulty obtaining new employment as she did not have current
marketable skills and no recent work experience outside of the
family business. At the time of the modification hearing Plaintiff
was working as a flight attendant for American Airlines earning
$1,400 gross monthly income.

Plaintiff's employment required her

to locate on the East Coast and at the time of the modification
hearing, she resided in a basement apartment in her mother's home
in Connecticut for which she paid rent.
16.

Since the divorce the Plaintiff has attempted to

sell the marital asset she received in the divorce consisting of
the parties' marital residence in Salt Lake City valued at $370,000
6

at the time of the divorce.

The Plaintiff had lowered the sales

price to $280,000 and had received only one offer of $185,000 which
she rejected.

She has continued to maintain the Salt Lake home as

a rental property and paying mortgage thereon while she resided on
the East Coast which resulted in very high housing costs.
17.

Although Plaintiff had rented her Salt Lake home

since the divorce the income therefrom did not pay for the mortgage
and taxes and she has had consistent losses as shown on her tax
returns for the maintenance and rental of that property.

At the

time of trial in October, 1990 her rental income thus far in the
year had been $4,200 and her mortgage costs had been $5,478 with
additional estimated taxes of $3,000 which would result in an
income loss that year.
18.

Plaintiff's monthly living expenses totalled $4,701

per month which included keeping tow homes and $907 per month on
installment debt relating to legal fees connected with the original
divorce and to repay her mother a $4,000 loan.

Plaintiff had

depleted all assets awarded to her property settlement other than
the real property in Salt Lake City.
19.

Since the divorce Plaintiff has had significant

periods of unemployment, higher costs of living with the necessity
of maintaining two homes, and her tax returns show regular losses
from business and real estate. Plaintiff has been dependent on her
7
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alimony of $lf500 per month to meet her basic living expenses which
do not include any of the luxuries or amenities she enjoyed during
her

marriage

to

Defendant

such

as

vacations,

country

club

memberships, or new vehicles.
20.

A review of Plaintiff's tax return shows that in

only one year, 1988, did her earned income exceeded her alimony
income, when she earned $20,609 in wages.

However, for the year

1990 Plaintiff projected total earnings of only $17,000 which is
less than her alimony.
21.

A comparison of the parties' lifestyles at the time

of the divorce modification in October, 1990 shows that Plaintiff's
lifestyle

has

substantially

decreased

since the time

of her

marriage and the lifestyle of the Defendant has remained unchanged
and continues to be a luxurious, very comfortable lifestyle.
22.

The Plaintiff is unable to meet her reasonable

monthly expenses through earnings alone and requires alimony to
assist in meeting her needs.

Plaintiff's expenses are not lavish

and are unusually high based on the need to maintain two homes and
to repay loans she has incurred to meet basic expenses since the
divorce.

Although Plaintiff's income may have increased from

$1,000 to $1,400 per month it is not sufficiently large of a change
to

support

a reduction

of

alimony

Plaintiff's needs.
8
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in this case

considering

C.

Findings on Attorney / s Fees.
23.

The Plaintiff requested that she be reimbursed her

attorney's fees in defending the modification petition.

At the

time of the modification hearing, Plaintiff was still paying the
legal costs of the initial divorce and owed her divorce attorney
$16 f 000 which she was paying at $100 a month.
24.

Plaintiff

incurred

$16,000

in

legal

fees

for

defending the modification proceeding and Defendant had incurred
$6,000 in bringing the modification petition.

Plaintiff's counsel

proffered the reasonableness and amount of fees without objection
by Defendant's counsel.
25.

The Court finds Plaintiff has a need for attorney's

fees, since her monthly expenses exceed her monthly income and it
would be a clear hardship for her to pay her fees unassisted.
addition

Plaintiff

is

still

paying

on

a

significant

In

balance

remaining from her original divorce.

The Plaintiff also had a

significantly

to

more

difficult

task

defend

against

the

modification brought by Defendant to uncover necessary financial
information

whereas

Defendant

had

that

information

within

his

control. The Defendant has also paid off significant debts since
the time of the parties' divorce, has invested in costly real
estate and is building a home, has many luxuries in his budget and
thus has the ability to assist Plaintiff in the payment of fees.
9
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Defendant should pay the full amount of Plaintiff's attorney's fees
in the amount of $16,000.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes
and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has jurisdiction over the parties to the

action and over the subject matter of this action.
2.

The parties are entitled to an order on Defendant's

Petition for Modification, the same to become final and effective
upon being signed by the Court which should be in conformance with
the foregoing Findings of Fact.
DATED this 2 *~ day of

^ )

^*1^-

1993.

BY THE COURT:

^HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing, FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AFTER REMAND, this

/*/* day of May, 1993, to:

Ms. Helen E. Christian, Esq.
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Suite 722, Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant

s5\12485.fof
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MAY 2 6 1993
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Cio/K

SUZANNE MARELIUS - 2081
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
00O00—•

MARITA W. MUIR,
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S PETITION
FOR MODIFICATION ON REMAND

Plaintiff,
v.

f

>-> -. ^ '

6LC^*?LIS

MICHAEL D. MUIR,
Defendant.

Case No. 844903928 DA
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson
00O00—•

The Utah Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the
above-referenced case to the Third District Court on November 12,
1992 with instructions that the Court make specific findingsf
supported by sufficient evidence regarding the issues of alimony,
substantial change in circumstances, and attorney's fees.

Having

reviewed the Court record and transcript hereinf and having issued
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Remand, and good
cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:

A-Hfc>
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1.

The Petition

for Reduction

and

Termination of

Alimony is denied as there are no substantial, material changes in
circumstances

of

the

parties

since

the

divorce

to

warrant

modification.
2.

The Defendant is ordered to pay all of Plaintiff's

costs and attorney's fees incurred in defending the Petition for
Modification in the amount of $16,000.
DATED this 2- ^ day of

^ \

^~\^—

1993.

BY THE COURT:

ONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing/ ORDER OF MODIFICATION ON
REMAND, this

/~7 day of May, 1993, to:

Ms, Helen E. Christian/ Esq.
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Suite 722/ Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant
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HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247)
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Attorney for Defendant
Suite 722 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7444
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
MARITA W. MUIR,
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS
TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL D. MUIR,

Case No. 844903928
Appeal No. 900603-CA

Defendant.
ooOoo
Defendant, MICHAEL MUIR, by and through his counsel of record,
Helen E. Christian, hereby files these objections to the Findings
of Fact as proposed by Plaintiff:
I.

SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES AS TO
DEFENDANT'S INCOME

Plaintiff would have the Court believe that there has been no
decrease in Defendant's income since entry of the Decree of Divorce
that would justify a modification of his alimony obligation to the
Plaintiff.

That is simply not the case and is unsupported by the

evidence presented at trial.
Plaintiff's proposed Finding No. 6 claims that Plaintiff's
income was $1,000 at the time of the divorce, but the evidence at
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trial established otherwise. Specifically, Plaintiff testified at
trial that she had "no real income" in 1985 (T.43) when the parties
were divorced, and that in 1986 she earned between $3,000 and
$4,000 (T.43).

At the time of the trial on Defendant's Petition

for Modification, Plaintiff was employed as a flight attendant and
was earning approximately $1,400 per month (T.164).

In addition,

and not included in Plaintiff's proposed Finding No. 6 as to her
income, Plaintiff received the following amounts:
(a)

$100 per month from a family trust (T. 163)

(b)

$220 per month from rental of a barn (T. 164) and

(c)

$1,200 per month from rental of the Salt Lake City

residence.
While Plaintiff claimed a loss from her rental of the Salt
Lake City residence, after payment of property taxes, mortgage
interest and insurance (Defendant's Exhibit 2), evidence at trial
established that Plaintiff would still generate income of several
hundred dollars each month from her rental of the property.
The bottom line is that Plaintiff's proposed Findings as to
her earnings are inaccurate and that she should properly claim
these additional amounts, giving her income of at least $2,000 per
month.

Inasmuch as the alimony awarded at the time of the divorce

was based on the fact that Plaintiff had no real source of income,
it was appropriate for the Court to find that her income had
increased sufficiently and decrease Defendant's alimony obligation.
2

Plaintiff's proposed Findings Nos. 7 and 8 are inaccurate and
do not reflect the evidence presented at trial. The fact that the
gross

receipts

(T.26)

fails

of

the

business

to address

had

the primary

declined
reason

nearly
that

$50,000

Defendant's

earnings had decreased, i.e., the substantial increase in the
expenses

of

operating

Fairmont

Bowl.

Ed

Bates, Defendant's

accountant, testified at trial that, as Defendant's ownership
percentage

in

the

decreased. (T. 24)

business

increased,

his

income

actually

In fact, Mr. Bates also testified that despite

the fact that the business had had less depreciation, and the
actual income of the business should have increased, the income had
still

decreased

since

the

time

of

the

parties'

divorce.

Defendant's Exhibit 3 admitted at trial illustrated that the gross
receipts for Fairmont Bowl had been decreasing since 1985 (T. 26).
The evidence at trial established that the net income of the
corporation for fiscal year ending June 1990, before Defendant's
compensation and before any depreciation deduction was taken, was
fifty-one percent (51%) less than it was in 1985.

Specifically,

the net income of the corporation for fiscal year ending June 1985
was $226,517, compared with $115,000 for fiscal year ending June
1990.

As Defendant testified at trial, these decreases are a

direct

result

of

the

need

to

increase

services

to maintain

clientele to justify the prices charged for the services (T. 64)
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and the fact that there are fewer participants in the sport. [See
Defendant's proposed Findings Nos. 4(a), 4(b), 4(c) and 4(d).]|
Plaintiff's proposed Finding No. 9 misrepresents the evidence
presented

at

trial

in the

following

particulars:

Defendant

testified that the "computerized" facility is actually a series of
scoring devices that are computerized

(T. 75).

Defendant also

testified that he had made other physical improvements, none of
them "substantial ones," except as to "dollars" (T.75), as follows:
carpet, new ball racks, new seating, and bowler seating. [See
Defendant's proposed Finding No. 12.]
Plaintiff's

proposed

Finding No. 9 also mischaracterizes

Defendant's testimony as to the necessity of future improvements
that he must make to the physical facility in order to maintain the
viability of Fairmont Bowl as a bowling center.
Defendant

needs

to

replace

the

thirty-two

Specifically,

lanes, which

are

approximately thirty (30) years old, and the cost to replace each
lane is $35,000. (T.65).
Finally, Plaintiff's proposed Finding No. 9 mistakenly states
that the capital improvements that Defendant must make to the
business are "discretionary," rather than absolutely necessary to
maintain the present operation of the business.

These necessary

expenditures, Defendant testified, will reduce the cash available
to him for earnings.( T. 66)

[See Defendant's proposed Findings

Nos. 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17.]
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Plaintiff's proposed Finding No. 10 as to financial statements
prepared

by the Defendant

for the purpose of obtaining

credit

misrepresents the evidence presented at trial. Defendant testified
that his net worth, as he made an "educated guess" on the financial
statements, was $479,000 in 1986 (Exhibit 6) and $542,000 in 1989
(Exhibit

9 ) , or an increase in net worth of only $62,000. (T.

112-113)

Defendant also testified that the increase in his net

worth was attributable to his increased stock ownership in Fairmont
Bowl. (T. 113)
Plaintiff f s proposed Finding No. 11 misstates the evidence
presented

at

trial

in

that

it

fails

to

include

the

primary

"disadvantage" of a Subchapter "S" corporation, i.e., the fact that
Defendant

must

claim

any

earnings

on

his

personal

tax

return

whether he takes the money out of the corporation or leaves it in
the corporation to pay off loans or use for operating expenses.
Plaintiff's proposed Finding No. 12 as to Defendant's personal
expenses and benefits that are paid from the business is incorrect
for these reasons:
(a)

Plaintiff

Defendant's

current

testified

at

trial

spouse, worked

that

she,

similarly

in the business

during

to
the

marriage, earning approximately $1,000 per month (T.155);
(b)

Defendant

testified

at trial

that his current

spouse

works in the business and her earnings are based on the actual time
she puts into the business (T.108);

5
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(c)

Defendant testified at trial that his present lifestyle,

compared with the lifestyle he and the Plaintiff had enjoyed during
their marriage, was "substantially" reduced (T. 70), specifically
testifying that he had sold the boat prior to the parties' divorce
in 1985 (T. 107), that he had "about $20,000 " in a plane that he
had purchased shortly after the divorce (..
business

paid

for

his

health

and

auto

106), and that the

insurance

(T. 106).

Defendant also testified that the business had always paid these
expenses, despite the fact that the accounting treatment of the
expenses had been modified.
Plaintiff's

proposed

Finding

No.

13

simply

ignores

the

testimony at trial and the actual findings of the Court when it
rendered its decision in this case. Specifically, the Court stated:
The Court is also persuaded that the
Defendant in the near future is going to have
to put some big
well, some money into his
business in order to stay up with the
competition. And that, of course any time you
are in business for yourself, you have
got to keep it up to date or you go behind fast.
(T. 214-215)
There has been a substantial change of circumstances since
entry of the Decree of Divorce in that (1) Plaintiff's earnings
went from virtually zero in 1985 to at least $17,000 per year (T.
214); (2) Defendant's earnings decreased from $118,600 to $81,600
per year (T.214); and Defendant needs to make some large capital

6

improvements to his business in order to maintain it in its present
condition.

Thus, Defendant met his burden of establishing a

material and substantial change of circumstances and the Court's
original ruling, supplemented by Defendant's proposed additional
Findings of Fact, should be affirmed.
II.

SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES AS TO
PLAINTIFF'S INCOME

Plaintiff claims that the evidence at trial supports her
proposed Findings Nos. 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, which is simply not
the case. The most credible evidence, the evidence which the Court
believed at trial, was that both parties had experienced a decrease
in the

standard

marriage.

of

the

lifestyle

they

enjoyed

during

their

Defendant testified that he had taken very few trips,

mostly just weekend trips to visit friends (T. 95-96) and that he
had sold his plane and his boat shortly before or after the divorce
(T.106-107) .
There

was

simply

no

evidence,

other

than

Plaintiff's

inconsistent testimony, regarding her "very high housing costs,"
presented at trial.

Plaintiff testified that she lived with her

mother (T.165), but also testified that she paid rent to live in
her mother's home (T.170).

There was no evidence presented at

trial regarding whether she actually is required to pay rent to her
mother and this finding should not be accepted by the Court.

7

Plaintiff's losses on the rental of the Salt Lake City home
were due in part to her decision to rent the home to friends at a
substantially reduced rental rate and to continue to pay the
utilities on that property during the period of their occupancy.
Defendant should not be penalized

for Plaintiff's decision to

discount the rental rate on the property.
Plaintiff's proposed Findings Nos. 19, 20, 21 and 22 should
not be accepted by the Court for the reason that they do not
comport

to the

findings made by the Court

Further, they do not

after

take into consideration

the trial.

all sources of

Plaintiff's income, as testified to at trial, including her wages,
rental income, both from the Salt Lake City residence and the barn,
and the money she receives from the family trust.
The Court concluded that there had been a substantial change
of circumstances in this case, but not one of "lifestyle" but
rather in the "income of the parties.1' (T. 213)
III.
Plaintiff's

FINDINGS ON ATTORNEY'S FEES

proposed

Finding

No.

24

includes

fees

that

Plaintiff incurred from the law firm of Van Cott, Bagley in the
amount of $13,179, as well as fees and costs as proffered by
Plaintiff's counsel at trial, estimated at $2,600.
testimony

as

to

the

reasonableness

of

the

fees

There was no
offered

by

Plaintiff's counsel as to the VanCott, Bagley amount, and the Court
had no record of the Affidavit allegedly submitted by Plaintiff's
8
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prior counsel, Mr. McNulty, as to the reasonableness of those fees.
(T. 194)
Plaintiff's proposed Finding No. 25 takes great liberties with
the Court's ruling and makes findings that the Court did not make
at trial.

Specifically, the Court did not find that Plaintiff's

expenses exceeded her monthly income, and did not find that it
would be a "hardship" for Plaintiff to pay her own fees unassisted
by Defendant.

The Court did express concern about the $22,000 in

attorney's fees incurred by the parties in this case, however, and
concluded that Plaintiff did need to "meet" the petition filed by
the Defendant. (T. 215)
The Court did not determine, nor can it be implied from the
Court's

ruling, that Defendant

attorney's
proposed

fees of
Findings.

should pay all of Plaintiff's

$16,000, as Plaintiff
The

Court

awarded

has claimed
Plaintiff

in her

$3,000

in

attorney's fees. The Utah Court of Appeals on remand directed this
Court

to enter

its Findings

as to

(1) Plaintiff's

need

for

attorney's fees; (2) Defendant's ability to assist Plaintiff in
paying her fees; and (3) the reasonableness of the fees charged.
[See Defendant's proposed Findings 19-23.]
WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully asks this Court for the
following relief:
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1.

For its Order denying Plaintiff's Motion for Order in Re:

Entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order of
Modification on Remand;
2.

For its Order granting Defendant's Motion for Order in

Re: Entry of Supplemental Findings of Fact;
3.

For its Order affirming its decision made at the time of

trial, specifically as follows:
(a)

Reducing Defendant's alimony obligation to Plaintiff

to the amount of $900 per month;
(b)

Ordering Defendant to pay $3,000 of Plaintiff's

attorney's fees and costs;
4.

Awarding such other and further relief as the Court deems

fair and equitable in the premises,
DATED this [ ^

day of June, 1993.
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN

AJUJT

HELEN E. CHRISTIAN
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT this _\

day of June, 1993,

addressed to:
SUZANNE MARELIUS
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

^^S-^-^>fc*w-^/\

Kristine Wimmer
muir.ob2

n
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY

MUIR, MARITA W
PLAINTIFF
VS
MUIR, MICHAEL DOUGLAS
DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:

CASE NUMBER 844903928 DA
DATE 08/19/93
HONORABLE HOMER F WILKINSON
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK DAG

HEARING

P. ATTY. MARELIUS, SUZANNE
D. ATTY. CHRISTIAN, HELEN E

OBJECTION TO FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE
DISCUSSED, BUT NOT RESOLVED.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
MUIR, MARITA W
PLAINTIFF
VS
MUIR, MICHAEL DOUGLAS

CASE NUMBER 844903 928 DA
DATE 12/22/93
HONORABLE HOMER F WILKINSON
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK DAG

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

THE COURT HAVING REVIEWED THE PLEADINGS, TRANSCRIPT OF
TRIAL AND DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS FOUND IS PERSUADED
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS FOUND THAT ERROR WAS COMMITTED AND HAS
REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT. THEREFORE, THE COURT
ADOPTS PLAINTIFF'S FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AFTER
REMAND AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR MODIFICATION ON
REMAND AS MODIFIED BY THE COURT. PLAINTIFF IS ALSO AWARDED
ATTORNEY FEES OF $4,507.50 AND COSTS OF $906.00 EXPENDED ON THE
APPEAL. PLAINTIFF SHALL PREPARE NEW PLEADINGS.
CC: SUZANNE MARELIUS
HELEN CHRISTIAN

A'fel
AA.9S1

i h»fu Judicial" District

JAN 2 0 394
By.

SUZANNE MARELIUS - 2081
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
MARITA W. MUIR,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AFTER
REMAND

Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL D. MUIR,

Case No. 844903928 DA
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendant.

ooOoo
The Utah Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the
above-referenced case to the Third District Court on November 12,
1992 with instructions that the Court make specific findings,
supported by sufficient evidence regarding the issues of alimony,
substantial change in circumstances, and attorney's fees.

Both

Plaintiff and Defendant submitted to the Court proposed Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order after Remand. The Court held a
hearing with counsel on August 17, 1993, at 8:00 a.m. and heard
argument on the matter. The Court took the matter under advisement
and issued a written Minute Entry on December 22, 1993, adopting
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the Plaintiff's proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order on Remand, with certain modifications.

The Court further

awarded the Plaintiff her costs and attorneys fees related to the
Appeal.
Having reviewed the Court records and transcript herein,
the parties Motions and proposed Findings and Order, the Court
issues the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on
remand to supplement the previous Findings entered in this case
arising from the Modification Trial held on October 11, 1990.

The

Court enters the following Findings of Fact on Remand as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties were married for more than twenty years

prior to their divorce on September 16, 1985.
2.
stipulation

The
of

the

initial

divorce

parties

and

was

each

party

resolved

by

received

an

joint
equal

property distribution which provided in relevant part that the
husband

receive all common

stock owned by the parties in the

business known as Fairmont Bowl and that the wife receive the
parties 7

residence.

The

husband

was

ordered

to

assume

the

liability for business loans incurred by Fairmont Bowl and the wife
was ordered to assume the mortgage debt on the residence.

2
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3.

The Defendant was

ordered

to pay

the

Plaintiff

alimony of $1,500 per month until her remarriage, cohabitation, the
death of one of the parties, or further order of the Court.
During the majority of the parties 7 marriage and at

4.

the time of the divorce, the Defendant derived all of his income
from his ownership of Fairmont Bowl and at the time of divorce
owned

78% of

the

stock

in the

entity.

At

the

time

of

the

modification hearing his stock ownership had increased to 91.3%,
with the parties' children owned the remainder of the stock.
5.
Defendant

petitioned

substantial
reduction

In August, 1989, five years after the divorce the

change
of

termination.

for

in

alimony

modification

material
for

of

alimony

circumstance

one

year,

claiming

and

he

followed

by

sought

a
a

complete

The Defendant based his petition on a claim that his

income had decreased and that the Plaintiff's income had increased.
A trial was held on the Defendant's Petition on October 11, 1990,
at which

both

parties

testified

along

with

accounting

expert

witnesses.
A.
Findings on Changes in Circumstances Regarding Defendant/s
Earnings.
6.

The

Defendant

alleged

specific

changes

in

circumstances in that although his gross revenues from his business
had

remained

consistent,

that

his

expenses

had

increased,
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depreciation

had

decreased

and

his

business

needed

capital

investment.
7.

Plaintiff's accountant Mr. Randall Peterson, CPAf

analyzed seven years of tax returns from 1983 through 1989 filed by
the Defendant.

He testified that the returns showed an average

"pre-divorce" income of to Defendant $104,678 and an average "postdivorce" income of $104,188.

Accountant Peterson analyzed the

Defendant's "net spendable income" from 1983 to 1989 showing his
post-divorce average (excluding alimony payments), to be $69,194
which was approximately $5,000 more than his before divorce average
of $64,819.
8.

The Defendant's accountant Mr. Ed Bates agreed with

Plaintiff's accountant that the gross revenues of the Fairmont Bowl
Corporation have been consistent and that it has been operated as
a Subchapter S Corporation since the parties' divorce.

On this

point, the accountants relied on the 1985 tax return for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1985 showing gross receipts to be $691,529 as
compared with gross receipts at the end of fiscal year June 30,
1990 where gross receipts were $645,102.
9.

The Defendant has made improvements to the Fairmont

Bowl facility and had just finished computerizing the facility,
added new carpeting, new racks, new seating and other improvements
since the divorce.

Defendant testified to the need for future
4

oo

improvements

as well.

Such

capital

improvements

are

in

the

discretion of Defendant whose personal and business finances are
intertwined.
10.

Since

the

divorce, Defendant

has

prepared

four

separate financial statements for First Interstate Bank which show
that his total assets and net worth since entry of the divorce as
stated by him have increased from at least $715,580 in assets on
the statement dated January 3, 1986 to $989,000 in assets on a
statement dated September 7, 1989.
11.

Both

Plaintiff's

and

Defendant's

accountants

testified that due to the corporation's Subchapter S status, the
Defendant

had

total

discretion

over

the

amount

he

took

as

compensation each year, in setting prices for his product, and in
making capital expenditures.
12.

The Defendant's business has paid for many personal

expenses for the Defendant and his family including payments for
his family car, health insurance, travel, auto and life insurance,
tax deferred benefits including pension contributions.

Defendant

benefits from his new wife drawing a salary from the corporation.
13.

Based on the foregoing evidence and Findings, the

Court finds that there has not been a substantial change in the
circumstances surrounding Defendant's earnings since the parties
divorce.

His income has been consistent when all personal benefits
5
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are considered and given the Defendant's discretion over allocating
income between personal and business uses, it is appropriate to
include all such personal benefits.
B.
Findings on Changes in Circumstances Regarding
Income.
14.

The Court

finds that

the Plaintiff's

Plaintiff's

only work

during the marriage was at Fairmont Bowl where her wages were
approximately $1,000 per month.

At the time of the modification

hearing Plaintiff was working as a flight attendant for American
Airlines

earning

$1,400

gross

monthly

income.

Plaintiff's

employment required her to locate on the East Coast where she
resided in a basement apartment in her mother's home in Connecticut
for which she paid rent.
15.

Plaintiff has attempted to sell the marital asset

she received in the divorce consisting of the parties' marital
residence in Salt Lake City valued at $370,000 at the time of the
divorce.

The Plaintiff had lowered the sales price to $280,000 and

had received only one offer of $185,000 which she rejected.

She

has continued to maintain the Salt Lake home as a rental property
and paying mortgage thereon.
16.

At

the

time

of

Trial

on

October

1990,

the

Plaintiff's rental income to date had been $4,200 and her mortgage

6

costs had been $5,478 with additional estimated taxes of $3,000
which would result in an income loss that year.
17.

Plaintiff's monthly living expenses totalled $4,701

per month which included keeping two homes and $907 per month on
installment debt relating to legal fees connected with the original
divorce and to repay her mother a $4,000 loan.
18.

Since the divorce Plaintiff has had significant

periods of unemployment, higher costs of living with the necessity
of maintaining two homes, and her tax returns show regular losses
from business and real estate. Plaintiff has been dependent on her
alimony of $1,500 per month to meet her basic living expenses which
do not include any of the luxuries or amenities she enjoyed during
her

marriage

to

Defendant

such

as

vacations,

country

club

memberships, or new vehicles.
19.

A review of Plaintiff's tax return shows that in

only one year, 1988, did her earned income exceeded her alimony
income, when she earned $20,609 in wages.

However, for the year

1990 Plaintiff projected total earnings of only $17,000 which is
less than her alimony.

Although Plaintiff's income may have

increased from $1,000 to $1,400 per month it is not sufficiently
large of a change to support a reduction of alimony in this case
considering Plaintiff's needs.
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C.

Findings on Attorney's Fees,
20.

The Plaintiff requested that she be reimbursed her

attorney's fees in defending the modification petition.

At the

time of the modification hearing, Plaintiff was still paying the
legal costs of the initial divorce and owed her divorce attorney
$16,000 which she was paying at $100 a month.
21.

Plaintiff

incurred

$13,179

to

the

law

firm

of

VanCott Bagley and $2600 to present counsel in legal fees for
defending the modification proceeding and Defendant had incurred
$6,000 in bringing the modification petition.

Plaintiff's counsel

proffered the reasonableness and amount of fees without objection
by Defendant's counsel.
22.

The Court finds Plaintiff has a need for attorney's

fees, based on her financial circumstances including the fact that
her

present

monthly

expenses

exceed

her monthly

income.

In

addition Plaintiff is still paying on a significant balance for
legal fees remaining from her original divorce. The Plaintiff also
had a significantly more difficult task to defend against the
modification brought by Defendant to uncover necessary financial
information

whereas

Defendant

had

that

information within

his

control. The Defendant has also paid off significant debts since
the time of the parties' divorce, has invested in costly real
estate and is building a home, and thus has the ability to assist
8
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Plaintiff in the payment of fees.

Defendant should pay the full

amount of Plaintiff's attorney's fees in the amount of $15,779,
less credit for the $3,000 he was ordered to pay at the initial
trial in this matter for an attorney fee award of $12,779.
P.

FINDINGS ON ATTORNEYS FEES FOR APPEAL
23.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff substantially

prevailed on the Trial issues heard on October 11, 1990, and has a
need for an award of attorneys fees and has been awarded her fees
arising from that trial.

The Defendant filed an Appeal to the

Court of Appeals and Plaintiff has filed an Affidavit of Attorneys
Fees on Appeal which has not been objected to.

The Court finds

Plaintiff's fees on Appeal to be reasonable and awards Plaintiff
and judgment against Defendant in the amount of $4,505.50.

The

Plaintiff is also awarded her costs relating to the Appeal in the
amount of $906.00 for a total amount of fees and costs arising from
the Appeal of $5,413.50.
E.

FINDINGS ON ALIMONY UNDERPAYMENT DURING PENDENCY OF APPEAL
24.

The Trial Court initially ruled that Defendant could

decrease his alimony payment of $1,500 per month to $900 per month
and this Order took effect commencing with the month of October
1990.

The Trial Court has not reinstated Plaintiff's alimony at

the level of $1,500 per month effective with the month of January,
1994.

The Court finds Plaintiff has been underpaid alimony by the
9
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Defendant in the amount of $600 per month for a period of thirtynine (39) months and is awarded a judgment against Defendant for
that arrearage in the amount of $23,400. The Defendant is ordered
to reinstate Plaintiff's alimony at the level of $1,500 per month
effective with the month of January, 1994.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes
and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has jurisdiction over the parties to the

action and over the subject matter of this action.
2.

The parties are entitled to an order on Defendant's

Petition for Modification, the same to become final and effective
upon being signed by the Court which should be in conformance with
the foregoing Findings of Fact.

.^

DATED this X ^ day of

/ ^ i /•

, ±9*3":

BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing, FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AFTER REMAND, this / /

day o f c f a ^ r , 199/,

to:
Ms. Helen E. Christian, Esq.
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Suite 722, Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant

sl2\12485.fo£
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T^->Hj«><i»cial District

JAN 2 0 39*
'-Ty./:--;.-r^
Deputy Clsrti

SUZANNE MARELIUS - 2081
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
f-\ v Q>

ooOoo
MARITA W. MUIR,

ORDER ON DEFENDANT^
PETITION FOR MODIFICATION
ON REMAND

Plaintiff,

^V"*-.

^ C C x> o 9 3

v.
MICHAEL D. MUIR,

Case No. 844903928 DA
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendant.
ooOoo

The Utah Court of Appeals reversed

and remanded the

above-referenced case to the Third District Court on November 12,
1992 with

instructions

that the Court make specific

findings,

supported by sufficient evidence regarding the issues of alimony,
substantial change in circumstances, and attorney's fees.

The

Court has entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law on
Remand pursuant to those instructions, and good cause appearing
therefore, enters the following Order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
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1.

The

Petition

for

reduction

and

termination

of

alimony filed by Defendant is denied and the Court finds there has
been no substantial material change in circumstances of the parties
since the divorce to warrant a modification of alimony.
2.

The Defendant is ordered to pay all of Plaintiff's

costs and attorneys fees incurred in defending the Petition for
Modification which total $15,779, less credit for $3,000 of fees
ordered in the initial trial, and Plaintiff is awarded a judgment
of $12,779.
3.

Plaintiff is awarded her attorneys fees arising from

having to Appeal the decision in this matter and is awarded the
amount of $4,507.50 and costs of $906.00 for a total amount of
$5,413.50 arising from the Appeal in this matter and Plaintiff is
awarded a judgment therefore.
4•

During the pendency of the Appeal the Defendant has

underpaid alimony to the Plaintiff in the amount of $600 per month
for a period of thirty-nine (39) months. Plaintiff is thus awarded
a judgment for this alimony arrears in the amount of $23,400.
5.

Defendant's

alimony

obligation

to

Plaintiff

is

reinstated at the level of $1,500 per month effective with the
month of January, 1994, and continuing thereafter.
6.

All judgments awarded to Plaintiff in this matter

are to bear interest at the legal rate of 5.72 percent until paid
2

00

and are to include after accruing costs of collection including
reasonable attorneys fees.

DATED this 2l

da

Y of

O/^*^

^

, 1994*

ONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON
District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing, ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S
PETITION FOR MODIFICATION ON REMAND, this
199$l, to:
Ms. Helen E. Christian, Esq.
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN
Suite 722, Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant

sl2\12485.ord
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